The	Kantian	(Non)-Conceptualism	Debate Colin	McLear University	of	Nebraska–Lincoln mclear@unl.edu July	21, 2014 Abstract One	of	the	central	debates	in	contemporary	Kant	scholarship	concerns	whether	Kant	endorses	a	"conceptualist"	account	of	the	nature	of	sensory	experience. Understanding	the debate	is	crucial	for	getting	a	full	grasp	of	Kant's	theory	of	mind, cognition, perception, and epistemology. This	paper	situates	the	debate	in	the	context	of	Kant's	broader	theory	of	cognition	and	surveys	some	of	the	major	arguments	for	conceptualist	and	non-conceptualist interpretations	of	his	critical	philosophy. 1 Introduction O NE OF THE CENTRAL TOPICS OF DEBATE in	contemporary	Kant	scholarship	has been	whether	Kant	endorses	a	position	concerning	the	nature	of	sensory	experience	called	"conceptualism." As	a	first	approximation, conceptualism	about experience	is	the	claim	that	the	capacity	for	conscious	sensory	experience	of	the	objective	world	depends, at	least	in	part, on	the	repertoire	of	concepts	possessed	by	the experiencing	subject, insofar	as	they	are	exercised	in	acts	of	synthesis	by	the	cognitive faculty	which	Kant	terms	the	"understanding"	[Verstand]. Exactly	how	we	should	understand	this	dependence	relation, as	well	as	the	notion	of	experience	that	it	presupposes, is	something	we	will	discuss	in	much	further	detail	below. The	historical	question	as	to whether	Kant	endorsed	conceptualism	has	also	been	linked	to	the	philosophical	question	as	to	the	commitments	of	the	conceptualist	position	and	whether	it	is, in	the	end, a	tenable	one. For	the	purposes	of	this	article	I shall	focus	primarily	on	the	historical	question, and thus	I will	largely	ignore	issues	in	the	philosophy	of	mind	and	perception	literature	that have	arisen	independently	of	the	scholarly	debate	concerning	Kant.1 The	argument	of	this	paper	proceeds	as	follows. §2	briefly	sketches	the	fundamental	elements	of	Kant's	theory	of	cognition. §3	articulates	several	major	considerations which	help	to	define	the	non-conceptualist	interpretation	of	Kant. In	§4	I elaborate	the conceptualist	interpretation	of	Kant. I present	and	to	some	extent	revise	what	I take	to be	the	core	interpretive	commitments	of	the	conceptualist	position. §5	discusses	several major	objections	to	conceptualism	and	non-conceptualism, as	well	as	a	central	issue of	contemporary	interest-viz. the	so-called	"Myth	of	the	Given"	and	its	connection	to the	conceptualism	debate. I then	summarize	the	argument	of	the	paper. 1 For	a	useful	overview	of	the	contemporary	literature	see Gunther	(2003); Siegel	(2010); Van Cleve	(2012). 1 The	Kantian	(Non)-Conceptualism	Debate Colin	McLear 2 A Sketch	of	Kant's	Theory	of	Cognition Kant's	conception	of	our	mental	economy	is	basically	tripartite, consisting	of	sensations [Empfindungen], intuitions [Anschauungen] and concepts [Begriffe].2 These are all varieties	of	what	Kant	calls	"representation"	[Vorstellung].3 In	what	is	generally	called	the	"stepladder"	[Stufenleiter]	passage	from	the	Transcendental	Dialectic	of	the	first Critique, one	of	the	few	places	in	the	Kantian	corpus	where he	explicitly	discusses	the	meanings	of	and	relations	between	his	technical	terms, Kant defines	and	classifies	varieties	of	representation. The category is representation (representatio) in general. Under it stand representations with consciousness (perceptio). A perception [Wahrnehmung], that relates solely to a subject as a modification of its state, is sensation (sensatio). An objective perception is cognition (cognitio). This is either intuition or concept (intuitus vel conceptus). The	first	relates	immediately	to	the	object	and	is	singular; the	second	is mediate, conveyed by a	mark, which can be common to	many things (A320/B376–7).4 As	Kant's	discussion	here	indicates, the	category	of	representation	contains	sensation, intuition, and concept. The faculty that provides sensory representations is called "sensibility" [Sinnlichkeit]. Sensibility generates representations based on being affected	either	by	entities	distinct	from	the	subject	or	by	the	subject	herself. This	is	in contrast	to	the	faculty	of	"understanding"	[Verstand]	which	generates	representations "spontaneously"-i.e. without	advertance	to	affection. 2 There	are	other	signficant	representational	kinds, such	as schemata and ideas, but	the	interpretive	tradition	has	focused	primarily	on	sensations, intuitions, and	concepts. I follow	that	tradition	in	my	discussion here. One	could, however, object	that	the	debate	is	not	well-formed, and	emphasize	the	importance of	including, e.g., schemata, in	the	discussion	of	the	relationship	between	concept	possession	and	perceptual	experience. For	discussion	of	schemata	in	the	generation	of	perceptual	"images"	see Matherne (Unpublished); cf. Griffith	(2012); Williams	(2012). 3 We	might	question	whether	it	is	best	to	translate	"Vorstellung"	as	"representation." The	reason	for	hesitation	has	largely	to	do	with	the	baggage	which	the	term	"representation"	carries	within	contemporary philosophy. It	is	often	characterized	as	an	"inner," causally	relevant, and	perhaps	functionally	defined state, whose	semantic	content	allows	it	to	play	a	role	in	the	cognitive	life	of	subject. In	what	follows	I will	translate	"Vorstellung"	as	"representation"	but	I wish	to	highlight	here	the	importance	of	not	simply equating	Kant's	use	of	"Vorstellung"	with	a	representationalist	theory	of	perception. For	an	argument	that Kant	does not endorse	such	a	theory	see McLear	(Forthcoming	b)	and	§3.1	below; cf. Gomes	(2014). 4 Quotations	from	Kant's	work	are	from	theAkademie	Ausgabe, with	the	firstCritique cited	by	the	standard A/B edition	pagination, and	the	other	works	by	volume	and	page. Translations	are	from	the	Cambridge Editions	of	the	Works	of	Immanuel	Kant, general	editors	Paul	Guyer	and	Allen	Wood. I have, on	some occasions, made	slight	modifications	without	further	comment. Specific	texts	are	abbreviated	as	follows: July	21, 2014-Forthcoming	in Philosophy	Compass 2 The	Kantian	(Non)-Conceptualism	Debate Colin	McLear Kant	claims	that	all the	representations	generated	via	sensibility	are	structured	by two	"forms"	of	intuition-space	and	time-and	that	all	sensory	aspects	of	our	experience	are	their	"matter"	(A20/B34). The	simplest	way	of	understanding	what	Kant	means by	"form"	here	is that	all	perceivables	will	be	such	as to	either	have	spatial features (e.g. extension, shape, location), or	temporal	features	(e.g. being	successive	or	simultaneous).5 So	the	formal	element	of	an	empirical	intuition, or	sense	perception, will always	be	either	spatial	or	temporal, while	the	material	element	is	always	sensory	(in the	sense	of	determining	the	phenomenal	or	"what	it	is	like"	character	of	experience), and	tied	to	one	or	more	of	the	five	senses, or	the	feelings	of	pleasure	and	displeasure. Kant	ties	the	two	forms	of	intuition	to	two	distinct	spheres, the	inner	and	the	outer. The	outer	concerns	the	spatial	world	of	particular	material	objects	while	the	inner	concerns	temporally	ordered	states	of	mind. Space	is	thus	the	form	of	"outer	sense"	while time	is	the	form	of	"inner	sense"	(A22/B37; cf. An	7:154). In	the	Transcendental	Aesthetic, Kant	is	primarily	concerned	with	"pure"	[rein]	intuition, and	often	only	speaks in	passing	of	the	sense	perception	of	physical	bodies	(e.g. A20–1/B35). However, Kant more	clearly	links	the	five	senses	with	intuition	in	the	1798 Anthropology	from	a	Pragmatic	Point	of	View, in	the	section	entitled	"On	the	Five	Senses." Sensibility in	the	cognitive	faculty	(the	faculty	of	intuitive	representations) contains two	parts: sense and the imagination...But the senses, on the other	hand, are	divided	into outer and inner sense	(sensus	internus); the first	is	where	the	human	body	is	affected	by	physical	things, the	second	is where	the	human	body	is	affected	by	the	mind	(An	7:153). An: Anthropology	from	a	Pragmatic	Point	of	View CJ: Critique	of	Judgment G: Groundwork	for	the	Metaphysics	of	Morals JL: Jäsche	Logic LL: Lectures	on	Logic NM: Attempt	to	Introduce	the	Concept	of	Negative	Magnitudes	into	Philosophy OD:On	a	Discovery	Whereby	any	New	Critique	of	Pure	Reason	is	to	be	Made	Superfluous	by	an	Older One Pr: Prolegomena	to	any	Future	Metaphysics R: Notes	and	Fragments 5 There	are	complications	here	that	I cannot	go	into, concerning	whether	or	how	spatial	objects	might be	represented	as	standing	in	temporal	relations	with	one	another	given	that	"Time	can	no	more	be intuited	externally	than	space	can	be	intuited	as	something	in	us"	(A22-3/B37). Kant	goes	on	to	say	that outer	objects	are	temporally	related	only	"mediately", in	virtue	of	their	representations	being	temporally related	in	inner	sense	(A34/B50-1). Thus, though	outer	objects	may	be	said	to	stand	in	temporal	relations, time	is	not	an	a	priori	condition	of	the	appearance	of	an	outer	object	in	the	way	that	space	is. Whether this	means	that	objects	in	space	only seem to	be	in	time, in	virtue	of	their	representations	being	intuited as	standing	in	temporal	relations	in	inner	sense, goes	beyond	what	I can	discuss	here. For	discussion see Van Cleve	(1999), ch. 5; Brook	(2013). July	21, 2014-Forthcoming	in Philosophy	Compass 3 The	Kantian	(Non)-Conceptualism	Debate Colin	McLear Kant	characterizes intuition	generally in terms	of two	characteristics-viz. immediacy [Unmittelbarkeit]	and particularity [Einzelheit]	(cf. A19/B33, A68/B93; JL 9:91). This	is	in	contrast	to	the	mediacy	and	generality	[Allgemeinheit]	characteristic	of	conceptual	representation	(A68/B93; JL 9:91). Kant	contrasts the	particularity	of intuition	with the	generality	of	concepts in the "stepladder"	passage	(see	the	first	quote	above). But	the	specific	remark	he	makes	is	that a	concept	is	related	to	its	object	via	"a	mark, which	can	be	common	to	many	things" (A320/B377)	and	this	suggests	that	intuition, in	contrast	to	concepts, puts	a	subject	in cognitive	contact	with	features	of	an	object	that	are	not	had	by	other	things.6 Spatiotemporal	properties	seem	like	excellent	candidates	for	such	features.7 But	pehaps	any non-repeatable, non-universal	feature	of	a	perceived	object	will	do.8 Does	the	occurrence	of	an	intuition	count	as	having	an	experience, in	our	contemporary	sense	of	a	cognitively	significant	mental	event	or	state	with	a	particular	(sensemodal)	phenomenal	character?9 More	generally, does	Kant's	usage	of	terms	like	"perception"	[Wahrnehmung]	and	"experience"	[Erfahrung]	cleanly	match	up	with	ours? Given	how	slippery	these	terms	are, even	in	their	everyday	usage, we	should	be	somewhat	cautious	in	thinking	that	they	do. At	least	two	worries	loom	large	here. First, we might	worry	that	disputes	concerning	the	necessary	conditions	of	having	a	"perception" or	an	"experience"	are	merely	verbal. Second, we	might	worry	that	the	concepts	<perception>	and	<experience>	are	not	well-defined, and	thus	that	no	substantive	dispute should	hang	on	either	of them. For the	purposes	of this	paper, I shall take the	concepts	<perception>	and	<experience>	as	sufficiently	well-defined	that	we	can	credibly 6 There	is	a	further	controversy	here	as	whether	the	immediacy	of	intuition	is	compatible	with	an	intuition's relating	to	an	object	by	means	of	marks	or	whether	relation	by	means	of	marks	entails	mediacy, and thus	that	only	concepts	relate	to	objects	by	means	of	marks. See Smit	(2000)	for	discussion. 7 This	is	true	at	least	if	we	assume	that	spatio-temporal	location	is	sufficient	to	individuate	one	thing	from another. Certainly	Kant	thought	this	the	case; cf. B327-8. 8 For	example, intuition	may	give	a	subject	perceptual	access	to	the	tropes	characterizing	an	object. For the	suggestion	of	a	view	along	these	lines	see Smit	(2000); Grüne	(2009), 50, 66-70. 9 A note	about	the	use	of	"cognitive"	here. There	is	a	difference	between	mental	states	which	possess	phenomenal	characteristics	but	no	seeming	objective	cognitive	features, such	as	what	happens	in	"seeing stars"	or	being	poked	in	the	eye, etc., and	states	that	are	both	phenomenally	rich	and	cognitive, such as	having	a	perceptual	experience	as	of	some	object	in	one's	environment, such	as	a	tree	or	animal. There	is, of	course, a	serious	question	as	to	whether	or	how	these	two	kinds	of	states	might	be	related. I shall	take	it	that	Kant's	usage	of	"intuition"	is	meant	to	designate	a cogntive state	rather	than	a	state which	merely	possesses	phenomenal	character. The	latter	seems	to	most	consistently	be	designated	by the	term	"sensation"	[Empfindung], or	more	precisely, by	"feeling"	[Gefühl]. This	is	especially	clear	in Kant's	discussion	of	sensation	and	feeling	in	the	third Critique; cf. CJ 5:189, 203-6. Whether	and	how such	cognitive	and	non-cognitive	states	are	related	is	a	complex	issue, and	we'll	touch	on	it	further	in the	discussion	of	conceptualism	below. July	21, 2014-Forthcoming	in Philosophy	Compass 4 The	Kantian	(Non)-Conceptualism	Debate Colin	McLear dispute	over	the	necessary	conditions	for	their	instantiation.10 But	I do	think	that	it	is necessary	to	say	something	about	the	possibility	of	a	merely	verbal	dispute	concerning the	conditions	for	the	occurrence	of	a	perceptual	experience. Kant	obviously	makes	a	distinction	between	"experience"	[Erfahrung]	and	"intuition" [Anschauung]. He	is	clear	that	"experience," in	his	sense	of	an	"empirical	cognition" [empirische	Erkenntnis], includes	conceptual synthesis, since	such	synthesis is	what binds	the	various	elements	of	an	empirical	cognition	together	such	that	they	are	nonarbitrarily	connected (cf. B12, B161, B201, B218, B233).11 As	a result, we	cannot understand	the	(non)-conceptualism	debate	as	concerning	"experience"	in	Kant's	sense of	the	term. Non-conceptualist	interpreters	all	concede	that	Kant's	usage	of	"experience" [Erfahrung]	and	"empirical	cognition"	[empirische	Erkenntnis]	typically	is	meant	in	a way	that	assumes	some	sort	of	cognitive	contribution	by	the	understanding. The	difficulties	that	result	in	trying	to	pin	down	Kant's	use	of	"experience"	[Erfahrung] have	not	gone	unnoticed in the literature.12 For	example, Hannah	Ginsborg	has	argued	that	Kant's	argument	that	the	understanding	must	be	active	in	the	generation	or constitution	of	"Erfahrung"	is	potentially	ambiguous	between	designating	sense	modal specific states of phenomenal consciousness-"sense impressions"-and full-blown perceptual judgments. But it	seems	clear that	Kant	himself took	the terms"intuition" [Anschauung], "perception"	[Wahrnehmung], and	"experience"	[Erfahrung]	to	designate	different	things.13 Intuition	is	a	relation	to	an	"undetermined"	[unbestimmt]	object	or	an	"appearance"	[Erscheinung]	(A20/B34). Intuition	is	distinguished	from	"perception"	[Wahrnehmung]	by	virtue	of the	subject's	being	conscious	of the	"content" [Inhalt]	of the intuition (more	on the	notion	of "content"	below) (Pr	4:300; cf. A99, A119-20, B162, B202-3).14 Finally, "experience" [Erfahrung] involves the synthesis of	perceptions	[Wahrnehmungen]	via	application	of	(or	perhaps	guidance	by)	the	categories. "Experience is	cognition through	connected	perceptions [durch	verknüpfte 10 See Hinton	(1973); Byrne	(2009)	for	contemporary	discussion	of	worries	concerning	the	notion	of	an "experience". 11 As	Kant	says	in	the Prolegomena, "Experience	consists	in	the	synthetic	connection	[Verknüpfung]	of	appearances	(perceptions)	in	a	consciousness, insofar	as	this	connection	is	necessary"	(Pr	4:305; cf. 4:275; B147, B218, B227). 12 See	the	discussion	in Van Cleve	(1999), 74-6; Ginsborg	(2006b). 13 Thanks	to	Clinton	Tolley	for	discussion	concerning	these	and	related	points. 14 What	exactly is intended	by	Kant's	use	of "conscious" [Bewusst] and	"consciousness" [Bewusstsein] further	complicates	matters. Significantly, for	our	purposes, we	cannot	take	for	granted	that	Kant	means to	indicate	what we typically	mean	in	using	the	term-viz. "phenomenal	consciousness"	or	"what	it	is like"	to	have	the	relevant	experience. Kant	typically	uses	the	term	in	the	Leibniz-Wolff	sense	in	which it	indicates	the	extent	to	which	the	representing	subject	can	distinguish	between	objects	or	the	parts	of objects. See Wunderlich	(2005); La Rocca	(2008a), La Rocca	(2008b); Grüne	(2009), ch.1; Sturm	and Wunderlich	(2010); McLear	(2011)	for	discussion. July	21, 2014-Forthcoming	in Philosophy	Compass 5 The	Kantian	(Non)-Conceptualism	Debate Colin	McLear Wahrnehmungen]"	(B161; cf. B218; Pr	4:300). This	threefold	distinction	is	also	confirmed	in	the	headings	to	the	first	three	chapters	of	the	Principles	of	the	first Critique, in	which	Kant	distinguishes	between	the	"Axioms	of Intuition", the	"Anticipations	of Perception", and	the	"Analogies	of	Experience". If	Kant weren't thinking	that	the	terms the	terms	"intuition"	[Anschauung], "perception"	[Wahrnehmung], and	"experience" [Erfahrung]	designated	distinct	mental	states, then	it	would	be	difficult	to	understand why	he	ordered	a	central	part	of	his	architectonic	around	them. There is	also	a	prima	facie tension	between	the	suggestion	above, that	we	distinguish	"intuition" from	"perception"-i.e	"Wahrnehmung"-and	Kant's remark in the Stufenleiter passage	quoted	above, that	"perception"	[perceptio]	is	the	category	of	"representation	with	consciousness", in	which	he	includes	intuition. One	difficulty	is	that "Wahrnehmung", "perceptio", and	"Perzeption"	are	all	typically	translated	in	English using	"perception", while	it	is	unclear	that	all	these	terms	mean	the	same	thing	for	Kant, or	that	they	mean	what wemean, using	"perception"	in	its	contemporary	English	sense. But	the	difficulty	isn't	just	related	to	the	problem	of	English	translation; rather, the	text of	the Stufenleiter seems	to	define	intuition	in	terms	of	being	a	conscious	representation (and thus	a "perceptio"), but I suggested	above the	Kant	distinguishes intuition from Wahrnehmung by	appeal	to	the	presence	of	consciousness	in	the	latter	but	not the	former. One	possible	move	in	resolving	this	tension	is	to	say	that	the	notion	of	"consciousness" in the Stufenleiter concerns consciousness of the representation, rather than, specifically, its	content. Intuitions, on	this	reading, would	be	conscious	representations, but	the	sense	in	which	they	are	conscious	differs	from	that	of	a Wahrnehmung. There is	already	ground	for	such	a	distinction	in	Kant's	differentiation	between	the	consciousness inherent in the awareness of a representation-its "clarity" [Klarheit], which requires	only	that	the	representation	suffice	for	distinguishing	an	object	from	others- and	the	consciousness	inherent	in	the	awareness	of	the	content	of	a	representation-its "distinctness"	[Deutlichkeit], which	requires	that	one	clearly	represent	all	the	different parts	of	the	content	of	the	representation	(or	the	parts	of	its	corresponding	object)	(An 7:137-8; cf. JL 9:34; R 643, 15:283; R 1709, 16:89).15 This	means	of resolving the issue	is	perhaps	made	even	more	attractive	by	Kant's	remark	in	the Anthropology that, distinctness	alone	makes	it	possible	that	an	aggregate	[Summe]	of	representations	becomes	a	cognition	[Erkenntnis], in	which	order	is	thought	in this	manifold, because	every	conscious	combination	[Zusammensetzung mit	Bewusstsein]	presupposes	unity	of	consciousness, and	consequently	a rule	for	the	combination. (7:138) 15 There	are	complications, however, in simply equating clarity	and	consciousness; cf. B414-15, note. Kant	also	seems	quite	happy	to	entertain	the	possibility	of	unconscious	or	"obscure"	[Dunkel]	intuitions (An	7:135); cf. Wunderlich	(2005), 141-2; Grüne	(2009), ch. 1.3. July	21, 2014-Forthcoming	in Philosophy	Compass 6 The	Kantian	(Non)-Conceptualism	Debate Colin	McLear This	passage suggests that	an intuition, of itself, is	at	best	conscious in the sense	of being clear [klar]. When	an	intuition	is	apprehended	in	an	act	ofWahrnehmung (cf. Pr 4:300), its	content	is	brought	together	in	such	a	way	that	it	becomes	(at	least	to	some degree) distinct [deutlich], and	thus	a	candidate	for	cognition. In	this	manner, we	seem able	to	resolve	the	tension	between	the	account	of	the	difference	between	intuition	and Wahrnehmung offered	above	and	Kant's	remarks	in	the Stufenleiter.16 Given	the	difficulty	of	providing	a	precise	account	of	how	Kant's	terminology	maps onto	contemporary	usage	(assuming	that	it	does	at	all), I focus	below	on	what	I take to be a central aspect of the contemporary debate between conceptualist and nonconceptualist	interpretations	of	Kant-viz. whether intuitions, understood	by	this	debate	as	mental	states	which	are	both	cognitive, and	have	sense-modal	specific	phenomenal	character, depend	on	(and	in	what	way	they	depend	on)	acts	of	the	understanding. The	emphasis	on	intuition	is	grounded	in	Kant's	texts	insofar	as	Kant	repeatedly	cites empirical	intuition	as	that	which	is	our	first	or	primary	means	of	being	sensorily	related to	actual	objects	(Pr	4:283; cf. Pr	4:350; B160; A180/B222; OD 8:217). I shall	freely use	the	terms	"perception", "experience", and	"perceptual	experience"	to	describe	the mental	states	Kant	designates	by	"intuition"	[Anschauung], so	long	as	it	is	understood that	these	English	terms	are	meant	in	our	contemporary	usage, not	necessarily	Kant's. So	I use	"outer	intuition"	(or	where	context	permits, simply	"intuition")	to	indicate, unless	otherwise	noted, the	perception	(i.e. the	English	term	for	cognitive	sensory	consciousness)	of	an	existence	distinct	from	the	subject. "Inner"	intuition, in	contrast, is the	awareness	of the subject's existence, and	a	particular	mode thereof (e.g. feeling warm, hungry, etc.). Both	are	forms	of experience in	the	English	sense	of	the	term- viz. a	cognitive	mental	state	or	event	with	a	particular	phenomenology	based	on	one of	the	five	senses. But, as	noted	above, neither	inner	nor	outer	intuition	is	sufficient	for experience	[Erfahrung]	in	Kant's	sense	of	the	term. Kant's	notion	of	an	experience	requires	conceptual	and	apperceptive	capacities	which	engender	an	awareness	of	lawful relations	between	consciously	perceived	objects, properties, states, or	events. The	question	to	which	we	now	turn	concerns	the	conditions	under	which	a	mental state type that	Kant	designates	as	"intuition" [Anschauung] requires	or	otherwise presupposes	mental	acts	of	synthesis	(or	at	least	the	capacity	for	such	acts)	by	the	understanding. 3 Kantian	Non-Conceptualism At	the	heart	of	non-conceptualist	readings	of	Kant	stands	the	denial	that	mental	acts	of synthesis	carried	out	by	the	understanding	are	necessary	for	the	occurrence	of	cognitive mental	states	of	the	type	which	Kant	designates	by	the	term	"intuition"	[Anschauung]. 16 Thanks	to	Sam	Rickless	for	encouraging	clarity	on	this	point. July	21, 2014-Forthcoming	in Philosophy	Compass 7 The	Kantian	(Non)-Conceptualism	Debate Colin	McLear Though it is controversial as to	what	might	be	considered the "natural"	or "default" reading	of	Kant's	mature	critical	philosophy, there	are	at	least	four	considerations	which lend	strong	support	to	a	non-conceptualist	interpretation	of	Kant's	mature	work. First, as	several	scholars	have	noted, Kant repeatedly	and forcefully	states that in our	cognition	there	is	a	strict	division	of	cognitive	labor	-	objects	are	given	by	sensibility	and	thought	via	the	understanding.17 As	Robert	Hanna	has	argued, when	Kant discusses	the	dependence	of	intuition	on	conceptual	judgment	in	the	Analytic	of	Concepts, he	is	specifically	talking	about cognition rather	than	what	we	would	consider	to be	perceptual	experience.18 Second, Kant	characterizes	the	representational	capacities	characteristic	of	sensibility	as	more	primitive than those	characteristic	of the	understanding (or reason), and as	plausibly	part	of	what	humans share	with the rest	of the	animal	kingdom.19 For example, Robert	Hanna	construes	Kant's	distinction	between	the	faculties	of	sensibility and	understanding	as	capturing	the	difference	between	the	"sub-rational"	powers	of	the mind	that	we	share	with	non-human	animals, and	the	"rational	or	higher-level	cognitive powers"	that	are	special	to	human	beings.20 If	one	were	to	deny	that, according	to	Kant, sensibility	alone	is	capable	of	producing mental	states	that	were	cognitive	in	character	then	it	would	seem	that	any	animal	which lacks	a	faculty	of	understanding, and	thus	the	capacity	for	conceptual	synthesis, would thereby lack	any	capacity for	genuinely perceptual experience. The	mental lives	of non-rational	animals	would	thus, at	best, consist	of	non-cognitive	sensory	states	which causally	correlate	with	changes	in	the	animal's	environment. Aside	from	what	we	would now	consider	to	be	an	unappealing	and	implausible	characterization	of	the	cognitive capacities	of	animals, this	reading	also	faces	textual	hurdles. Kant	is	on	record	in	various places	as	saying	that	animals	have	sensory	representations	of	their	environment	(CPJ 5:464; LM 28:449; cf. An	7:212), that	they	have	intuitions	(LL 24:702), and	that	they are	acquainted	with	objects	though	they	do	not	cognize	them	(JL 9:64–5).21 If	Kant's	position	is	that	synthetic	acts	carried	out	by	the	understanding	are	necessary for the cognitive standing	of a	mental state, then	Kant is contradicting fundamental 17 Hanna	(2005); Allais	(2009); McLear	(2011); Hanna	(2011a); Tolley	(2013); McLear	(Forthcoming	a), McLear	(Forthcoming	b). 18 See	the	discussion	of	Kant's	"togetherness	principle"	and	it's	significance	for	setting	the	conditions	on objectively	valid	judgment	in Hanna	(2005), 265-7. 19 Kant connects the possession of a faculty of sensibility to animal nature in various places, e.g. A546/B574, A802/B830; An	7:196. 20 Hanna	(2005), 249; cf. Allais	(2009); McLear	(2011), McLear	(Forthcoming	a), §3. 21 For	further	discussion	see Naragon	(1990); Allais	(2009); McLear	(2011). For	some	defense	of	the	conceptualist	position	see McDowell	(1996), chs. 3	&	6; Ginsborg	(2006b), Ginsborg	(2006a); Ginsborg (2008); Gomes	(2014). July	21, 2014-Forthcoming	in Philosophy	Compass 8 The	Kantian	(Non)-Conceptualism	Debate Colin	McLear elements	of	his	own	position	in	crediting	intuitions	(or	their	possibility)	to	non-rational animals. Third, any	position	which	regards	perceptual	experience	as	dependent	upon	acts	of synthesis	carried	out	by	the	understanding	must	also	construe	the	"pure"	intuitions	of space	and	time	as	dependent	upon	acts	of	synthesis.22 However, Kant's	discussion	of space	(and	analogously, time)	in	the	third	and	fourth	arguments	(fourth	and	fifth	in	the case	of	time)	of	the	Metaphysical	Exposition	of	Space	in	the	Transcendental	Aesthetic seems	incompatible	with	such	a	proposed	relation	of	dependence. Kant's	point	in	the	third	and	fourth	arguments	of	the	Metaphysical	Exposition	of	space (and	similarly	of	time)	is	that	no	finite	intellect	could	grasp	the	extent	and	nature	of	space as	an	infinite	whole	via	a	synthetic	process	moving	from	part	to	whole. If	the	unity	of the	forms	of	intuition	were	also	something	dependent	upon	intellectual	activity, then this	unity	would	necessarily	involve	the	discursive	(though	not	necessarily	conceptual) running	through	and	gathering	together	of	a	given	multiplicity	(presumably	of	different locations	or	moments)	into	a	combined	whole, which	Kant	believes	is	characteristic	of synthesis	generally	(A99). But	Kant's	arguments	in	the	Metaphysical	Expositions	of	space	and	time	require	that the	fundamental	basis	of	our	representation	of	space	and	time	does	not	proceed	from	a grasp	of	the	multiplicity	of	features	of	an	intuited	particular	to	the	whole	that	has	those features. Instead	the	form	of	pure	intuition	constitutes	a	representational	whole	that	is prior to	that	of	its	component	parts	(cf. CJ 5:407-8, 409).23 Hence, Kant's	position	is	that	the	pure	intuitions	of	space	and	time	possess	a	unity wholly	different	from	that	given	by	the	discursive	unity	of	the	understanding	(whether it	be	in	conceptual	judgment	or	the	intellectual cum imaginative	synthesis	of	intuited objects	more	generally). The	unity	of	aesthetic	representation-characterized	by	the forms	of	space	and	time-has	a	structure	in	which	the	representational	parts	depend on	the	whole. The	unity	of	discursive	representation-representation	where	the	activity of	the	understanding	is	involved-has	a	structure	in	which	the	representational	whole depends	on	its	parts.24 Finally, there	has	been	extensive	discussion	of the	non-conceptuality	of intuition in	the	secondary	literature	on	Kant's	philosophy	of	mathematics. For	example, Michael Friedman	has	argued	that	the	expressive	limitations	of	the	prevailing	logic	in	Kant's	time required	the	postulation	of	intuition	as	a	form	of	singular, non-conceptual	representa22 This	position	is	forcefully	articulated	in Longuenesse	(1998), ch. 8; see	also Griffith	(2012); Friedman (2012). 23 Kant's	argument	here	is	directed	very	much	against	the	Leibnizian	view	that	all	representation	is	purely conceptual. For	further	discussion	see Adams	(1994), ch. 9; Janiak	(2012). 24 For	much	more	extensive	discussion	of	this	issue	see McLear	(Forthcoming	a); cf. Messina	(2014); Onof and	Schulting	(Forthcoming). July	21, 2014-Forthcoming	in Philosophy	Compass 9 The	Kantian	(Non)-Conceptualism	Debate Colin	McLear tion.25 Charles	Parsons	and	Emily	Carson	have	argued	that	space	must	be	given	in	a phenomenological	manner	as	an	original, non-conceptual	representation	in	order	that we	be	able	to	demonstrate	the	real	possibility	of	constructed	mathematical	objects	as required	for	geometric	knowledge.26 Ultimately, however, there	are	difficulties	in	assessing	whether	Kant's	philosophy	of	mathematics	can	have	relevance	for	the	conceptualism	debate, since	the	sense	in	which	intuition	must	be	non-conceptual	in	accounting for	mathematical	knowledge	is	not	obviously	incompatible	with	claiming	that	intuitions themselves	(including	pure	intuition)	are	dependent	upon	a	conceptually-guided	synthesis.27 The	non-conceptualist	reading	is	thus	clearly	committed	to	allowing	that	sensibility alone	provides, in a perhaps very primitive	manner, objective representation	of the empirical	world. Sensibility	is	construed	as	an	independent	cognitive	faculty, which humans	share	with	other	non-rational	animals, and	which	is	the	jumping-off	point	for more	sophisticated	conceptual	representation	of	empirical	reality. 4 Kantian	Conceptualism In	the	introduction	I characterized	conceptualism	as	claiming	that	there	is	a	dependence relation	between	a	subject's	having	conscious	sensory	experience	of	an	objective	world, and	the	repertoire	of	concepts	possessed	by	the	subject	and	exercised	in	acts	by	her faculty	of	understanding. As	a	first	pass	at	sharpening	this	formulation, we	may	understand	conceptualism, as	it appears	in	the	scholarly	literature	on	Kant, as	a	thesis	consisting	of	two	claims: (i)	sense experience	has	correctness	conditions	determined	by	the	"content"	of	the	experience; (ii)	the	content	of	an	experience	is	a	structured	entity	whose	components	are	concepts. Let's	take	these	in	turn. 25 Friedman	(1992), ch. 2; cf. the	discussion	of	the	non-conceptual	conditions	of	judgments	of	equality in Anderson	(2005), 54-8	and	the	discussion	of	the	representation	of	homogeneous	units	in Sutherland (2008). 26 Parsons	(1964); Parsons	(1992); Carson	(1997); Carson	(1999); cf. Hanna	(2002). For	a	general	overview of	related	issues	in	Kant's	philosophy	of	mathematics	see Shabel	(2006)	and	the	works	cited	therein	at p. 107, note	29. 27 Michael	Friedman	(Friedman	(2012))	has	recently	articulated	such	a	position; cf. Longuenesse	(1998). If, as	Friedman	argues, Kant's	notion	of	the	conceptual	is	tied	to	his	logic, then, as	we	move	away	from syllogistic	logic	post-Frege, there	may	be	notions	of	the	conceptual	that	are	compatible	with	Kant's	views in	mathematics. For	discussion	see MacFarlane	(2002); Anderson	(2004), Anderson	(2005). July	21, 2014-Forthcoming	in Philosophy	Compass 10 The	Kantian	(Non)-Conceptualism	Debate Colin	McLear 4.1 Content	&	Correctness An	important	background	assumption	governing	the	conceptualism	debate	construes mental	states	as	related	to	the	world	cognitively	(as	opposed	to	merely	causally)	if	and only	if	they	possess	correctness	conditions. That	which	determines	the	correctness	condition	for	a	state	is	that	state's	"content". Suppose, for	example, that	an	experience	E has	the	following	content	C: C:	That	cup	is	white. This	content	determines	a	correctness	condition	V: V:	S's	experience	E is	correct	iff	the	cup	visually	presented	to	the	subject	as the	content	of	the	demonstrative	is	white	and	the	content	C corresponds to	how	things	seem	to	the	subject	to	be	visually	presented. Here	the	content	of	the	experiential	state	functions	much	like	the	content	of	a	belief state	to	determine	whether	the	experience, like	the	belief, is	or	is	not	correct. A state's	possession	of	content	thus	determines	a	correctness	condition, in	virtue	of which	we	can	construe	the	state	as	mapping, mirroring, or	otherwise	tracking	aspects of	the	subject's	environment. Perhaps	the	most	prominent	recent	interpretation	of	Kant	as	endorsing	the	content assumption	is	found	in	John	McDowell's Mind	and	World. McDowell's	project	there is	to	show, given	certain	presuppositions	concerning	the	nature	of	justification, how	it is	that	experience	can	play	a	justificatory	and	not	merely	causal	role	in	the	fixation	of belief. In	the	course	of	this	argument	McDowell	articulates	very	clearly	a	commitment to	construing	representational	content	as	the	kind	of	thing	that	is	correct	or	incorrect. He	says, The	very	idea	of	representational	content	brings	with	it	a	notion	of	correctness	and	incorrectness: something	with	a	certain	content	is	correct, in	the relevant	sense, just	in	case	things	are	as	it	represents	them	to	be. I can	see no	good	reason	not	to	call	this	correctness	"truth." But	even	if, for	some reason, we	reserve	that title	for	correctness	in	this	sense	when	it is	possessed	by	things	with	conceptual	content, it	seems	a	routine	thought	that there	can	be	rational	connections	between	the	world's	being	as	a	possessor of	one	bit	of	content	represents	it	and	the	world's	being	as	a	possessor	of another	bit	of	content	represents	it, independently	of	what	kind	of	content is	in	question.28 28 McDowell	(1996), 162. Many	of	McDowell's	interlocutors	share	similar	views. Cf. Evans	(1982), 202; Peacocke	(1992), 55, 65; Burge	(2003), 506. July	21, 2014-Forthcoming	in Philosophy	Compass 11 The	Kantian	(Non)-Conceptualism	Debate Colin	McLear McDowell	explains	the	close	connection	between	the	idea	of	representational	content	and	that	of	correctness	in	terms	of	the	normative	character	of	any	world-directed mental	state, a	paradigmatic	instance	of	which	is	judging	that	something	is	the	case. He says, To	make	sense	of	the	idea	of	a	mental	state's	or	episode's	being	directed towards	the	world, in	the	way	in	which, say, a	belief	or	judgement	is, we need	to	put	the	state	or	episode	in	a	normative	context. A belief	or	judgement	to	the	effect	that	things	are	thus	and	so-a	belief	or	judgement	whose content	(as	we	say)	is	that	things	are	thus	and	so-must	be	a	posture	or stance	that	is	correctly	or	incorrectly	adopted	according	to	whether	or	not things	are	indeed	thus	and	so. (If	we	can	make	sense	of	judgement	or	belief as	directed	towards	the	world	in	that	way, other	kinds	of	content-bearing postures	or	stances	should	easily	fall	into	place).29 Here	McDowell	claims	that	beliefs	and	judgments	have	a	particular	way	of	disclosing the	world to a subject and that this is a	way in	which	we	might	understand	worlddirected	mental	states	more	generally. He	further	claims	that	the	way	in	which	a	mental	state is	directed	at the	world is in terms	of its	possessing	a	correctness	condition concerning	how	the	world	in	fact	is. McDowell	then	relates	his	understanding	of	such world-disclosing	or	world-directed	states	to	perceptual	experience. We	should	understand	what	Kant	calls	"intuition"-experiential	intake- not	as	a	bare	getting	of	an	extra-conceptual	Given, but	as	a	kind	of	occurrence	or	state	that	already	has	conceptual	content. In	experience	one takes	in, for	instance	sees, that	things	are	thus	and	so. That	is	the	sort	of thing	one	can	also, for	instance, judge.30 McDowell	here	utilizes	Kant's	term	"intuition"	[Anschauung]	which	McDowell	equates with	"experiential intake.''	So	he	endorses the idea that intuition	has	content (being necessary	for	our	"taking	in"	that	something	is	the	case), and	that	it	is	in	virtue	of	this content	that	the	experiential	state, together	with	the	world, is	either	correct	or	incorrect. From	this	we	can	conclude	that, according	to	McDowell, intuitions	have	representational	content, that	this	entails	that	such	content	is	assessable	for	its	correctness, and that	intuitions	with	content	are	thereby	mental	states	assessable	for	their	correctness. Hence, McDowell's	interpretation	clearly	understands	Kant	as	endorsing	a	version	of the	content	assumption. 29 McDowell	(1996), xi-xii. 30 McDowell	(1996), 9. July	21, 2014-Forthcoming	in Philosophy	Compass 12 The	Kantian	(Non)-Conceptualism	Debate Colin	McLear Many	non-conceptualist	opponents	of	McDowell's	interpretation	nevertheless	share with	him	an	endorsement	of	the	content	assumption.31 However, they	differ	with	him in	at	least	one	of	two	ways. First, the	content	of	an	experience	which	sets	its	correctness conditions	is	attributed	to	the	experience	regardless	of	what, if	any, other	conceptual capacities	the	subject	may	have. Non-conceptual	contents	are	thus	meant	to	capture aspects	of	the	perceiving	subject's	experience	that	may	well	outrun	the	subject's	own capacities	for	articulation.32 Second, proponents of non-conceptualist readings of content	may construe nonconceptual	contents	as	correct	in	a	manner	that	is	altogether	distinct	from	conceptual contents, which	are	true	or	false	depending	on	whether	the	conditions	set	out	by	the concepts	constituting the	content	are satisfied. In	contrast, non-conceptual	content, much	like	the	content	of	a	map	or	a	recording, is	accurate	or	inaccurate. It	thus	admits of	degrees	of	approximation.33 Thus, for	many	non-conceptualists, while	it	is	still	the	case	that	a	subject's	mental states	only	count	as	representational	in	virtue	of	possessing	correctness	conditions, the nature	and	articulation	of	these	correctness	conditions	may	well	differ	radically	from those	set	out	by	conceptualism. We	can	see	these	two	features	of	non-conceptualism	at	work	in	an	interpretation of	Kant	that	is, in	many	ways, directly	opposed	to	McDowell's	conceptualism. Robert Hanna	has	argued that, for	Kant, sensible intuitions	possess	wholly	non-conceptual representational	content. We	can	see	this	in	two	quotes	from	Hanna, the	first	of	which describes the	non-conceptualist position and	attributes it to	Kant, while the second articulates	in	greater	detail	the	kind	of	representational	content	Hanna	thinks	is	present in	perceptual	experience. Non-conceptualism	holds	that	non-conceptual	content	exists	and	is	representationally	significant...Non-conceptual	cognitive	content	in	the	contemporary	sense	is, for	all	philosophical	intents	and	purposes, identical	to intuitional	cognitive	content	in	Kant's	sense.34 31 Many, but	not	all. See Tolley	(2011), Tolley	(2013); McLear	(Forthcoming	b). 32 Endorsement	of	this	thesis	sometimes	goes	under	the	name	'state	non-conceptualism'	or	'relative	nonconceptualism.' See Heck	(2000); Speaks	(2005); cf. Allais	(2009); Hanna	(2005), Hanna	(2008), Hanna (2011b). 33 Cf. Burge (2003). This conception of non-conceptual content also goes under name 'content nonconceptualism'	or	'absolute	non-conceptualism.' See, again, Heck	(2000); Speaks	(2005). 34 Hanna	(2005), 248. July	21, 2014-Forthcoming	in Philosophy	Compass 13 The	Kantian	(Non)-Conceptualism	Debate Colin	McLear essentially	non-conceptual	content	is	either	accurate	or	inaccurate, and as	I have	suggested, inherently	poised	for	use	in	the	intentional	actions	of conscious	animals.35 We	can	thus	see	that	for	Hanna, intuitional	content	is	non-conceptual	but	nevertheless representational-it	expresses	an	accuracy	condition	in	virtue	of	which	the	mental	state represents	some	portion	of the	mind-independent	world. Hanna's	position (both	on its own	and	as attributed to	Kant) regards this	nonconceptual content as essentially veridical, indexical, and	context	dependent.36 But	the	basic	presumption	which	drives Hanna's	non-conceptualism	is	the	same	as	that	of	McDowell's	conceptualism. A mental state	counts	as	a	state	of	perceptual	awareness-i.e. a	"world-directed"	state-only	in virtue	of	having	a	representational	content	which	sets	a	correctness	condition	for	the state. Hence, Hanna, like	McDowell, articulates	an	interpretation	which	endorses	the content	assumption. I take	it	that	McDowell's	and	Hanna's	views	are	representative	of	two	extremes	regarding	interpretations	of	Kant	understanding	of	the	content	of	intuition. McDowell, at least	in	the	discussion	in Mind	and	World, argues	that	intuition	is	through	and	through conceptual. That	is, McDowell	understands	the	representational	content	of	perception as	the	same	kind	of	content	as	is	found	in	beliefs	or	thoughts. So	the	content	of	an	experience	is	a	conceptually	structured, truth-evaluable	proposition.37 Hanna, in	contrast, argues	that	intuition	has	absolute non-conceptual content-it	has	a	structure	essentially different	in	nature	from	that	of	conceptual	content.38 Hanna	and	McDowell	articulate	the	basic	shape	of	much	recent	debate	concerning 35 Hanna	(2008), 58. 36 Hanna	(2006), chs. 1-2; Hanna	(2011b); cf. Howell	(1973); Pereira	(2013)	. 37 McDowell	has	since	changed	his	view. A more	current	specification	of it	states that intuition	is	not propositional	in	structure	though	it	nevertheless	possesses	conceptual	content. See McDowell	(2008). However, since	McDowell	still	construes	the	content	of	intuition	as	intentional	and	conceptual, bringing with	it	a	normative	notion	of	correctness, I consider	even	his	more	current	statements	to	be	an	endorsement	of	the	content	assumption. Cf. McDowell	(2013), where	he	explicitly	says	that	it	is	"in	virtue	of having	content	as	they	do	that	perceptual	experiences	put	us	in	such	[i.e. cognitive]	relations	to	things" (p. 144). 38 Hanna	(2011a), 354; cf. Hanna	(2005). July	21, 2014-Forthcoming	in Philosophy	Compass 14 The	Kantian	(Non)-Conceptualism	Debate Colin	McLear the	interpretation	of	Kant's	views	concerning	perceptual	experience.39 So	whether	a perceptual	experiential	state	has	conceptually	structured	content	(McDowell), or	nonconceptually	structured	content	(Hanna), it	is	in	virtue	of	the	state's	aiming	at	a	way	the world	might	be, and	thus	having	a	correctness	condition, that	the	state	counts	as	a	form of	perceptual	awareness. There	are reasons for	questioning	whether	Kant	endorses the	content	assumption as	I've	articulated	it	above.40 Kant	seems	to	deny	several	claims	which	are	integral	to it. First, in	various	places	he	explicitly	denies	that	intuition, or	the	deliverances	of	the senses	more	generally, are	the	kind	of	thing	which	could	be	correct	or	incorrect	(A293– 4/B350; An	§11	7:146; cf. LL 24:83ff, 103, 720ff, 825ff). Second, Kant's	conception of	representational	content	requires	an	act	of	mental	unification	(Pr	4:304; cf. JL §17 9:101; LL 24:928), something	which	Kant	explicitly	denies is	present in	an	intuition (B129-30; cf. B176-7).41 Finally, Kant's	"modal"	condition	on	cognition, that	it	provide a	demonstration	of	what	is	really	actual	rather	than	merely	logically	possible, seems to	preclude	an	endorsement	of	the	content	assumption. However, for	the	purposes	of understanding the	conceptulism	debate, we	will	assume that	Kant	does	endorse the content	assumption. The	question	then	is	how	to	understand	the	nature	of	the	content so	understood. 4.2 Conceptual	Content In	addition to the	content	assumption, I defined	conceptualism	as	committed to the content	of	intuition	being	completely	composed	of	concepts. Against	this, Clinton	Tolley	(Tolley	(2013), Tolley	(2011))	has	argued	that	the	immediacy/mediacy	distinction between	intuition	and	concept	entails	a	difference	in	the	content	of	intuition	and	concept. 39 There	are	a	great	many	other	ways	to	articulate	the	notion	that	intuition	has	content	within	the	limits	set by	Hanna	and	McDowell. For	example, there	are	coherent	interpretations	which	deny	that	intuition	has conceptual	content, but	assert	that	it	is	the	result	of	an	imaginative	synthesis, and	hold	that	the	images which	constitute	experiential	consciousness	are	constructions	according	to	conceptual	rules. Hence, insofar	as	the	images	purport	to	be	representational	they	must	be	attributed	a	content	determined	by the	rules	of	their	construction. In	my	terms, this	amounts	to	a	variation	of	the	Content	assumption. See Longuenesse's	discussion	of	concepts	as	rules for	sensible	synthesis. Longuenesse	(1998), 50ff. See also Anderson	(2001); Land	(2011); Matherne	(Unpublished). Watkins (2008), 519-20	also	suggests an	imagistic	view, though	it	is	not	fully	articulated. Other	views	that	seem	compatible	with	such	an account	include Strawson	(1966); Strawson	(1970); Sellars	(1968); Ginsborg	(2006b); Ginsborg	(2006a). Schulting	(2012)	presents	a	recent	and	helpful	overview	of	many	of	the	relevant	issues. 40 See McLear	(Forthcoming	b)	for	more	extensive	discussion. 41 Kant	does	not, however, deny	that	intuition	has	"content"	[Inhalt]	in	some	sense	other	than	that	of	a correctness	condition. For	discussion	see Tolley	(2011), Tolley	(2013); McLear	(Forthcoming	b). July	21, 2014-Forthcoming	in Philosophy	Compass 15 The	Kantian	(Non)-Conceptualism	Debate Colin	McLear if	we	understand	by	"content"...a	representation's	particular	relation	to	an object...then	it is	clear that	we	should	conclude	that	Kant	accepts	nonconceptual	content. This is	because	Kant	accepts that intuitions	put	us in	a	representational relation to	objects that is	distinct in	kind from	the relation	that	pertains	to	concepts. I argued, furthermore, that	this	is	the meaning	that	Kant	himself	assigns	to	the	term	"content". (Tolley	(2013), 128) Insofar	as	Kant	often	speaks	of	the	"content"	[Inhalt]	of	a	representation	as	consisting	in a	particular	kind	of	relation	to	an	object	(Tolley	(2013), 112; cf. B83, B87)	Tolley	thus gives	us	a	kind	of	"short	argument"	for	a	non-conceptualist	reading	of	Kant: 1. The	content	of	a	cognition	(whether	intuition	or	concept)	consists	in-i.e. is	nothing	but-a	relation	to	an	object 2. Concepts	and	intuitions	relate	to	objects	in	different	ways-viz. mediately	and immediately 3. ∴ The	content	of intuition is	different from the	content	of concepts-i.e. it is non-conceptual Tolley's	argument	gives	us	good	reason	to	reject	the	idea	that	intuition	could	have, in Kant's	sense	of	the	term, a	concept	as	its	"content".42 However	it	does	not	demonstrate that	the	content	of	what	Kant	calls	an	intuition	is	not	something	that we would	construe as	conceptual, in	a	wider	sense	of that term. For	example, both	pure	and	complex demonstrative	expressions	have	conceptual	form	(e.g. that	color, this	person), but	are not, in	Kant's terms, "conceptual" since they	do	not exhibit the requisite generality which, according	to	Kant, all	conceptual	representation	must.43 4.3 Conceptualism	&	Synthesis If it isn't textually	plausible to	understand the	content	of an intuition in conceptual terms	(at	least	as	Kant	understands	the	notion	of	a	concept)	then	what	would	it	mean to	say	that	Kant	endorses	conceptualism	with	regard	to	experience? The	most	plausible interpretation, endorsed	by	a	wide	variety	of interpreters, reads	Kant	as	arguing that the	generation	of	an	intuition, whether	pure	or	sensory, depends	at	least	in	part	on	the activity	of	the	understanding. On	this	way	of	carving	things, conceptualism	does not consist	in	the	narrow	claim	that	intuitions	have	concepts	as	contents	or	components, but	rather	consists	in	the	broader	claim	that	the	occurrence	of	an	intuition	depends	at 42 For	opposing	views	see Willaschek	(1997); Griffith	(2012); Engstrom	(2006). 43 For	further	discussion	see McLear	(Forthcoming	b), §5.2; Thompson	(1972). July	21, 2014-Forthcoming	in Philosophy	Compass 16 The	Kantian	(Non)-Conceptualism	Debate Colin	McLear least	in	part	on	the	discursive	activity	of	the	understanding.44 The	specific	activity	of	the understanding	is	that	which	Kant	calls	"synthesis", the	"running	through, and	gathering together"	of	representations	(A99).45 What's	more, the fact that intuitions	are	generated	according to	acts	of synthesis directed	by	or	otherwise	dependent	upon	conceptual	capacities	provides	some	basis	to claim	that	whatever	correctness	conditions	might	be	had	by	intuition	must	be	in	accord with	the	conceptual	synthesis	which	generated	them. This	seems	nicely	in	line	with Kant's	much	quoted	claim, The same function that gives unity to the	different representations in a judgment also	gives	unity	to	the	mere	synthesis	of	different	representations in	an	intuition, which, expressed	generally, is	called	the	pure	concept	of understanding. (A79/B104-5) The	link	between	intuition, synthesis	in	accordance	with	concepts, and	relation	to an	object	is	made	even	clearer	by	Kant's	claim	in	§17	of	the	B-edition	Transcendental Deduction	that, Understanding is, generally	speaking, the	faculty	of cognitions. These	consist	in	the	determinate	relation	of	given	representations	to	an	object. An object, however, is	that	in	the	concept	of	which	the	manifold	of	a	given intuition	is united. (B137; emphasis	in	the	original) However	else	we	are	to	understand	this	passage, Kant	here	indicates	that	the	unity	of an	intuition	necessary	for	it	to	stand	as	a	cognition	of	an	object	requires	a	synthesis	by the	concept	<object>. In	other	words, cognition	of	an	object	requires	that	intuition	be unified	by	an	act	or	acts	of	the	understanding. According	to	the	conceptualist	interpretation	we	must	understand	the	notion	of	a representation's	content	as	a	relation	to	an	object, which	in	turn	depends	on	a	conceptually	guided	synthesis. So	we	can	revise	our	initial	definition	of	conceptualism	to	read it	as	claiming	that	(i)	the	content	of an	intuition	is	a	kind	of	relation	to	an	object; (ii) 44 McLear	(Forthcoming	a)	calls	this	broader	position	"Intellectualism", so	as	to	emphasize	the	importance of	the	understanding's	activity, rather	than	the	specific	conceptual	content	of	that	activity. 45 See Grüne	(2009), ch. 2	for	an	alternative	taxonomy. Grüne	distinguishes	"judgment-theoretic"	[Urteilstheoretik]	from	"conceptualist"	[Konzeptualist]	interpretations	on	the	basis	of	whether	the	interpretation construes	the	intuitive	representations	generated	by	sensory	synthesis	in	terms	of, or	implying, judgment (Grüne	(2009), 111-12). However, she	and	I agree	that	such	"judgment-theoretic"	views	are	not	definitive	of	a	broadly	conceptualist	interpretation, and	that	whether	one	takes	Kant	as	arguing	that	intuition depends	on	a	conceptually-guided	synthesis	remains	a	significant	difference	between	conceptualist	and non-conceptualist	interpretations	(Grüne	(2009), §2.4; cf. Grüne	(2008)). So	I take	the	discussion	here to	be	broadly	congenial	to	her	own. July	21, 2014-Forthcoming	in Philosophy	Compass 17 The	Kantian	(Non)-Conceptualism	Debate Colin	McLear the	relation	to	an	object	depends	on	a	synthesis	directed	in	accordance	with	concepts; (iii)	synthesis	in	accordance	with	concepts	sets	correctness	conditions	for	the	intuition's representation	of	a	mind-independent	object.46 5 Objections One	of the	main	criticisms	of the	conceptualist reading	of	Kant is that it seemingly commits	him	to	the	position	that	perceptual	experience	is	constrained	by	the	subject's repertoire	of	concepts. However, Hannah	Ginsborg	has	argued	that	Kant's	conceptualism	need	not	be	construed	in	such	a	way.47 Instead, there	is	room	for	a	less	demanding	conception	of	what	it	is	for	understanding	to	be	involved	in	perceptual	synthesis, a	conception	which	does	not require	that	any	concepts	be	grasped	antecedently	to	engaging	in	synthesis. On	this	conception, to	say that	synthesis involves	understanding is simply to	say that it involves	a	consciousness	of	normativity...I want to claim	that	this	consciousness	of	normativity	is	possible	without	the	subject's	first	having	grasped	any	concept	governing	her	synthesis, and, more specifically, without	her	synthesis	needing	to	be	guided	by	any	concept. (Ginsborg	(2008), 71) According	to	Ginsborg, we	need	not	read	the	conceptualist	as	making	the	strong	claim that perceptual experience is constrained by conceptual repertoire that the subject brings	with	them	to	experience. Instead, we	need	merely	see	the	issue	of	conceptualization	as	one	in	which	the	subject	combines	an	association	of	some	bundle	of	sense impressions	with	the	sense	that	she	is	associating	them	as	she	ought, and	it	is	this	consciousness	of	the	normativity	of	one's	combination	that	is	responsible	"for	the	objectdirected	character	of	our	perceptions" (Ginsborg (2008), 74). Hence, if	Ginsborg is correct, one	of	the	main	sources	for	objecting	to	conceptualist	readings	of	Kant-viz. their	supposed	denial	that	non-rational	animals	enjoy	perceptual	experiences-would be	removed.48 46 One	might	worry	here	about	the	object	of	perceptual	hallucination. I set	this	issue	largely	to	one	side, though	it	is	compatible	with	the	account	given	above	that	the	"objects"	to	which	one	is	immediately	related	in	perception	are	always	"intentional"	objects. See Aquila	(1983); Pereboom	(1988); Longuenesse (1998), 20-6; Aquila	(2003), Aquila	(2008); Grüne	(2009), 42. 47 For	alternative	construals	of	the	conceptuality	of	experience	that	also	see	themselves	as	compatible	with the	claim	that	experience	is	primitive	see Gomes	(2014); Gomes	(Manuscript); Land	(2011). 48 Ginsborg's	position	has	been	criticized	by	scholars	on	either	side	of the	conceptualism	debate. See Grüne	(2008); Allais	(2009), 401. July	21, 2014-Forthcoming	in Philosophy	Compass 18 The	Kantian	(Non)-Conceptualism	Debate Colin	McLear Perhaps	the	most	obvious	objection	to	the	non-conceptualist	reading	of	Kant	stems from	his	famous	statement	that, Intuition	[Anschauung]	and	concepts	[Begriffe]	therefore	constitute	the	elements	of	all	our	cognition	[Erkenntnis]...Thoughts	without	content	[Inhalt] are	empty, intuitions	without	concepts	are	blind. . . . The	understanding	is	not	capable	of	intuiting	anything, and	the	senses	are	not	capable	of thinking	anything. Only	from	their	unification	can	cognition	arise. (A50– 51/B74–75; my	emphasis) The	so-called	"blindness"	problem	raises	two	issues. First, that	intuitions	without	concepts	or	conceptual	synthesis	are	not	intentional	states, and	so	cannot	provide	the	mind with	relation	to	an	object.49 Second, that	we	cannot	even	identify	the	cognitive	contribution	made	by	sensory	experience	independent	of	its	conceptualization.50 Against	the	first	point	it	has	been	argued	that	if	Kant's	concern	is	with	the	mechanism(s)	that	undergirds	intentional	states, and	he	thinks	that	possession	of	a	faculty	of understanding	is	a	necessary	condition	for	being	in	intentional	states, then	he	would be	simply	confused	in	attributing	the	possibility	of	intentional	states	to	non-rational	animals.51 It	has	also	been	pointed	out	that, to	the	extent	that	Kant	problematizes	the	issue of	intentional	relations, it	is	at	best	intentional	relations	to	external	mind-independent objects that	are in	question, and	not intentional relations (such	as those involved in thinking	of	one's	own	mental	states) überhaupt.52 Against	the	second	point, Lucy	Allais	(Allais	(2009))	has	forcefully	argued	that	if	we take	Kant's	definition	of	intuition	(and	likewise	of	concepts)	seriously, then	we must be able	to	identify	an	independent	contribution	of	sensibility	to	cognition-viz. singular and	immediate	representation	of	an	object-lest	we	fail	to	make	sense	of	Kant's	division	between	intuition	and	concept.53 It	would	also	be	extremely	odd	of	Kant	to	deny the	possibility	of	articulating	the	distinct	contribution	made	by	sensibility	given	that	he goes	so	far	as	to	organize	the	structure	of	argument	in	the	first Critique around	the	distinction	between	those	contributions	made	by	sensibility	(the	Transcendental	Aesthetic) and	those	made	by	the	understanding	(the	Transcendental	Logic, and	in	particular, the 49 For	a	clear	statement	of	the	view	that	conceptual	synthesis	is	the	mechanism	by	which	sensory	states first	achieve	the	status	of	intentional	states	see George	(1981); Pereboom	(1988); cf. Van Cleve	(1999), 95-7. 50 Falkenstein	(1995); McDowell	(1996). McDowell	famously	claims	that	sensibility	cannot	be	even	"notionally	seperated"	from	contributions	made	by	the	understanding	(McDowell (1996), 51). Cf. Bird (2006), ch. 7.2. 51 See Naragon	(1990); Allais	(2009); McLear	(2011)	and	the	references	cited	in	notes 20 and 21 above. 52 Cf. George	(1981), 233	and	Van	Cleve's	critical	discussion	in Van Cleve	(1999), 96. 53 Allais	(2009), 393-4; cf. Falkenstein	(1995), 63. July	21, 2014-Forthcoming	in Philosophy	Compass 19 The	Kantian	(Non)-Conceptualism	Debate Colin	McLear Analytic).54 The	claim	of	"blindness", it	is	argued, should	not	be	interpreted	as	so	extreme	as	to	render	unintelligible	fundamental	aspects	of	Kant's	architectonic, or	of	his repeated	statements	concerning	the	individual	cognitive	roles	of	the	faculties	of	sensibility	and	understanding. Finally, at	best, the	blindness	problem	seems	to	concern	the difficulties	involved	in	articulating	the	nature	of	sensory	content	without	drawing	on concepts	in	the	process	of	providing	the	articulation.55 But	this	can	be	conceded	without	thereby	admitting	that	there	is	no	sensory	content	(or	positive	cognitive	contribution) independent	of	conceptual	articulation. A significant	further	source	of	criticism	of	the	non-conceptualist	reading	is	that	it	at best	renders	ineffectual	Kant's	apparent	strategy	for	demonstrating	the	legitimacy	of	the categories	in	the	argument	of	the	Transcendental	Deduction, and	at	worst	shows	Kant to	be	totally	confused	in	his	argumentative	strategy.56 A key text for this reading	comes in the	conclusion to the second	or	"B-edition" version	of	the	argument	of	the	Transcendental	Deduction. [E]verything	that	may	ever	come	before	our	senses	must	stand	under	the laws	that	arise a	priori from	the	understanding	alone	(B160)	. . . Consequently	all	synthesis, though	which	even	perception	itself	becomes	possible, stands	under	the	categories, and	since	experience	is	cognition	though connected	perceptions, the	categories	are	conditions	of	the	possibility	of experience, and	are	thus	also	valid a	priori of	all	objects	of	experience. (B161) What this	passage	and	its	context	suggest is that the	culmination	of	Kant's	argument demonstrating	the	legitimacy	of	the	a	priori	concepts	he	calls	the	"categories"	requires showing	that	all	perception	depends	on	a	synthesis	via	the	categories. Here, however, it is	important	to	note	that	Kant	is	using	"perception"	[Wahrnehmung]	in	his	own	technical sense, as	discussed	in	§2	above, rather	than	our	contemporary	English	sense. So	he argues	here	that	the	categories	are	necessary	for	consciousness	of	the	complex	content of	an	intuition. But	it isn't	clear	that	this	is	equivalent	to	being	necessary	for	having an	intuition, and	thus	for	having	a	sensory	experience	in	the	contemporary	sense	with which	we've	been	concerned. A further, and	much	discussed, text in the	B-edition	Transcendental	Deduction is also	often	taken	as	supporting	a	conceptualist	interpretation. There	Kant	says, Space, presented	as	object	(as	we	are	actually	required	to	represent	it	in	geometry), contains	more	than	[the]	mere	form	of	intuition-viz. it	contains 54 Bird	(2006), 127 55 Bird	(2006), 129-30. 56 Cf. Ginsborg	(2008), 68-9; Griffith	(2012). For	criticism	see Allais	(2009); Tolley	(2013); McLear	(Forthcoming	a). July	21, 2014-Forthcoming	in Philosophy	Compass 20 The	Kantian	(Non)-Conceptualism	Debate Colin	McLear also	the	gathering-together	[Zusammenfassung]	of	the	manifold	given	according	to	the	form	of	sensibility, in	an	intuitive	representation-so	that the	form	of	intuition	gives	us	merely	a	manifold, but	formal	intuition	gives us	unity	of	representation. In	the	Transcendental	Aesthetic	I had	merely	included	this	unity	with	sensibility, wanting	only	to	point	out	that	it	precedes any	concept. But	this	unity	indeed	presupposes	a	synthesis	which	does	not belong	to	the	senses, through	which	all	concepts	of	space	and	time	first become	possible. For	through	this	unity	(inasmuch	as	understanding	determines	sensibility)	space	or	time	are	first	given	as	intuitions, and	hence the	unity	of	this	intuition	belongs a	priori to	space	and	time, and	not	to	the concept	of	understanding	(see	§24)	(B160-1, note). Here the	conceptualist takes	Kant to "complete" the	argument	of the	Deduction	by arguing that even the existence	of space and time as	pure intuitions depends	on a synthesis	by	the	categories.57 The	conceptualist	idea	here	is	that, by	making	space	and time	themselves	depend	on	a	categorial	synthesis, Kant	assures	his	desired	conclusion- viz. that	all	possible	empirical	intuition	must	depend	on	the	categories, and	thus	that	all possible	objects	of	empirical	intuition	must	fall	under	the	categories. The	conceptualist thus takes this	as	proof that	a	non-conceptualist	approach to	reading the	Deduction must	make	the	argument	there	hopeless	and	Kant's	strategy	deeply	confused.58 One thing to note about the footnote passage is that, in the	first sentence, Kant explicitly	invokes	the	notion	of	space	as	an	object	of	geometry. But	it	isn't	obvious	that Kant	identifies	the	conditions	under	which	a	subject	may	represent	space	geometrically with	the	conditions	for	representing	space simpliciter. In	fact, Kant's	distinction	in	the footnote	between	the	forms	of	intuition	and	formal	intuition	suggests	that	he	denies	any such	identification. So	Kant	can	consistently	hold	that	the	unity	of	the	representation of	the	pure	forms	of	intuition-space	and	time-is	independent	of	any	synthesis, while acknowledging, as	he	does	in	the	last	sentence	of	the	note, that	the	representation	of these	entities	as	objects, as	we	do	in the formal intuitions	required	for	mathematics, requires	a	pre-conceptual	synthesis	carried	out	by	the	imagination.59 57 The	source	of	this	interpretation	seems	to	be	Hegel. See Hegel	(1977), 69-72. For	relevant	discussion see Pippin	(1989), 29-31; Waxman	(1991), 79ff; Longuenesse	(1998), ch. 8; Keller	(1998), 107-12, 254; McDowell	(2003), McDowell	(2007); McLear	(Forthcoming	a); Messina	(2014). 58 Longuenesse	(1998); Wenzel	(2005); Gomes	(2010); Land	(2011); Griffith	(2012); Gomes	(2014). Not all	non-conceptualists	take	up	this	challenge. Hanna	(2011b)	simply	accepts	this	as	a	consequence	of Kant's	non-conceptualist	position, and	construes	Kant	as	deeply	divided	in	his	own	views	on	the	matter. For	objections	to	Hanna's	position	see Grüne	(2011); Schulting	(2012). For	an	extensive	discussion	of	the B160-1	footnote	and	defense	of	a	non-conceptulist	reading	of	it	see Onof	and	Schulting	(Forthcoming). 59 Cf. the	discussion	in McLear	(Forthcoming	a), §2.1. July	21, 2014-Forthcoming	in Philosophy	Compass 21 The	Kantian	(Non)-Conceptualism	Debate Colin	McLear We've	also	seen	one	non-conceptulist	argument, above, that	Kant's	argumentative strategy	in	the	Deduction	cannot	depend	on	making	the	unity	of	intuition	itself	dependent	on	synthesis	because	it	jeopardizes	his	arguments	in	the	Transcendental	Aesthetic. Such	an	interpretation	would	also	directly	contradict	Kant's	characterization	of	the	finite nature	of	human	intellectual	activity	(CJ 5:407; cf. B72; CJ 5:251-2, 253-4).60 Other non-conceptual	replies	to	this	conceptualist	reading	include	denying	that	the	synthesis	required	for	the	unity	of	perceptual	intuition	is	itself	conceptual,61 and	distinguishing	between the having of	an intuition, and the representation	of the	content	of an intuition-where	the	latter	is	understood	as	a	determinate	representational	relation	to some	object.62 Finally, and	perhaps	most	centrally	for	some	conceptualist	readings	(most	notably Sellars's	and	McDowell's), the	role	of	concepts	in	the	generation	of	perceptual	experience	is	supposed	to	help	explain	how	perception	can	play	a	justificatory	rather	than merely	a	causal role in the	fixation	of	belief. Non-conceptualism, so the	objection goes, cannot	account	for	the	justificatory	role	of	perceptual	experience	in	the	fixation of	empirical	belief. Versions	of	this	objection	have	often, since	Wilfred	Sellars's	famous paper, gone	under	the	moniker	of	the	"Myth	of	the	Given".63 While	it	is	not	entirely obvious	how	Kant's	texts	or	arguments	yield	any	substantive	connection	with	the	concerns	articulated	by	Sellars, I shall	suggest	below	three	possible	ways	in	which	such	a connection	might	be	understood. The	exact	nature	of	objections	to	the	supposedly	mythical	"Given"	vary.64 One	objection, made	by	Sellars, is	that	justifiers	for	belief	must	have	a	certain	kind	of	structure- viz. a	fact-like	structure	that	mirrors	the	propositional	structure	of	belief. In	contrast, sensory	experiences	(construed	as	sensations)	are	particulars	rather	than	facts, and	so cannot	play	any	justificatory	role.65 This	"premise	principle", as	it	has	been	called	in contemporary	epistemology, thus	plays	a	significant	role	in	motivating	the	rejection	of experience, insofar	as	it lacks	representational	content, as	a	potential	justifier	for	be60 For	further	discussion	of	this	point	see McLear	(Forthcoming	a). 61 Rohs	(2001), 220-1; Allais	(2009), 395-6, 406-7; cf. Tolley	(2013). Willaschek	(1997)	argues	that	intuition causally relates	to	its	object	independent	of	concepts, but	only	has	intentional content given	a conceptual	syntheis. Hanna	takes	another	tack	and	argues	that	sensibility	has	its	own	form	of	spontaneous	synthesis	distinct	from	the	understanding's	(cf. Hanna	(2008), 62). 62 Tolley	(2013), 122-24. 63 Sellars	(1956), reprinted	in Sellars	(1963); cf. McDowell	(1996); McDowell	(1998a), McDowell	(1998b), McDowell	(1998c); Abela	(2002) 64 Cf. Watkins	(2008); Watkins	(2012). 65 Sellars	(1956), reprinted	in Sellars	(1963), 128. All	further	page	references	will	be	to	the	reprint. Cf. BonJour	(1985), ch. 4. July	21, 2014-Forthcoming	in Philosophy	Compass 22 The	Kantian	(Non)-Conceptualism	Debate Colin	McLear lief.66 For	example, John	McDowell	argues	that The	idea	of	the	Given	is	the	idea	that	the	space	of	reasons, the	space	of	justifications'	or	warrants, extends	more	widely	than	the	conceptual	sphere. But	we	cannot	really	understand	the	relations	in	virtue	of	which	a	judgment is	warranted	except	as	relations	within	the	space	of	concepts: relations such	as	implication	or	probabilification, which	hold	between	potential	exercises	of	conceptual	capacities67 The	passage	in	Kant	typically	adduced	in	support	of	this	point	is	the	"same	function" passage	at	(A79/B104-5)	quoted	in	§4.3	above.68 Thus, according	to	this	conceptualist reading	of	Kant, sense	experience would have	the	requisite	proposition-like	structure, and	thus	be	capable	of	standing	in	justificatory	relations	to	beliefs, since	the	same	capacities	that	structure	the	contents	of	judgment	for	Kant	(viz. the	categories)	would	also structure	sensory	experience. While	such	interpreters	are	surely	correct	that	Kant's	aim, as	exemplified	in	this	passage, is	to	show	that	the	very	same	cognitive	capacities	which connect	representations	in	a	mental	act	of	judging	are	also	in	play	in	the	connection of	representations	in	a	sensory	experience, it	is	not	obvious	how	the	passage	directly supports	any	argument	concerning	the	epistemic	significance	of	perceptual	experience to	knowledge. Endorsement	of	the	premise	principle	is	a	substantive	epistemological commitment, and	despite	what	Kant	says	in	the	A79/B104-5	passage	concerning	the unity	of	judgment	and	intuition, it	is	not	at	all	obvious	that	Kant	endorses	the	principle.69 Hence	further	work	needs	to	be	done	to	show	that	Kant	actually	endorses	or even	articulates	this	argument. A second	objection	against	the	Given, that	might	be	attributed	to	Kant, is	that	the mere	occurrence	of	a	sensory	experience	cannot	license	any	particular	belief. Instead, sensory	experience	can	only	play	its	justificatory	role	against	a	background	of	concepts possessed	by	the	experiencing	subject.70 This	connects to	Kant	at least in	the	sense that, if the	conceptualist reading is correct, there is a	particular	battery	of concepts 66 See Pryor	(2005); Siegel	and	Silins	(Forthcoming); McLear	(Forthcoming	b), §4.3	for	discussion. 67 McDowell	(1996), 7; cf. BonJour	(1985),78; Davidson	(1986), 310; Brewer	(1999), 154 68 See	e.g. Sellars	(1968), 4-5; McDowell	(2003), 79; Haag	(2007), 150-1, 199, and	ch. 8; Kalderon	(2011), 235-6. Cf. Pippin	(1982), 99-101; Heidegger	(1997), 45-6; Longuenesse	(1998), 200; Grüne	(2009), 107-11. 69 For	example, according	to	at	least	one	prominent	interpretation	of	Kant's	epistemology, Kant	endorses an	at	least	partly	"externalist"	position	concerning	epistemic	justification, and	thus	does	not	endorse	the premise	principle	in	the	manner	required	to	plausibly	attribute	to	him	this	version	of	the	"Myth	of	the Given"	argument. See Chignell	(2007b), 49-50; McLear	(Forthcoming	b), §4.3. 70 Sellars	(1963), 170; McDowell	(1998a), 435-6. July	21, 2014-Forthcoming	in Philosophy	Compass 23 The	Kantian	(Non)-Conceptualism	Debate Colin	McLear necessary	for	any	perceptual	experience	to	play	a	role	in	justification	or	the	acquisition of	empirical	knowledge-viz. the	categories.71 Again	though, one	might	worry	about	attributing	the	above	argument	to	Kant. Certainly	Kant	thought	that	empirical	intuition	alone	was	insufficient	to	count	as	empirical knowledge	and	that	the	legitimate	application	of	the	categories	was	necessary	for	any such	knowledge. But	much	more	would	need	to	be	said	regarding	whether	or	how	intuition	might	stand	in	epistemic	relations	to	beliefs.72 There	is	no	straightforward	route from	Kant's	argument	concerning	the	role	of	the	categories	in	empirical	knowledge	to the	conclusion	that	the	epistemological	status	of	intuition	depends	on	the	categories. Indeed, there	may	be	reasons	to	think	that	Kant	would	reject	such	a	claim. For	example, Kant	seems	to	hold	that	in	intuition	we	"prove	the	possibility"	of	the subject	matter	of	our	thoughts. Kant	makes	this	point	explicitly	in	the	preface	to	the B-edition	of	the	first Critique. To cognize an	object, it is required that I be able to	prove its possibility	(whether	by	the	testimony	of	experience	from	its	actuality	or a	priori through	reason). But	I can think whatever	I like, as	long	as	I do	not	contradict	myself, i.e., as	long	as	my	concept	is	a	possible	thought, even	if	I cannot	give	any	assurance	whether	or	not	there	is	a	corresponding	object somewhere	within	the	sum	total	of	all	possibilities. But	in	order	to	ascribe objective	validity to such	a	concept (real	possibility, for the	first sort	of possibility	was	merely	logical)	something	more	is	required	(Bxxvi). Here	Kant	contrasts	merely	logically	possible	thought, in	which	one	brings	together	logically	compossible	concepts, with	the	kind	of	real	empirical	possibility	necessary	for cognition. Kant	distinguishes	between	these	two	sorts	of	possibility	in	terms	of	the	notion	of	cancellation	[Aufhebung]. The	subject	matter	of	a	thought	is logically possible	if the	thought's	constituent	concepts	may	be	combined	in	judgement	without	contradiction, and	thus	without	being	logically	cancelled	out	(A151/B190; NM 2:171–2). The subject	matter	of	a	thought	is really possible, in	contrast, if	it	can	be	shown	that	the	subject	matter	to	which	the	thought	corresponds	consists	of	properties	which	are	mutually empirically	compossible	and	not, in	Kant's	terms, "really	repugnant." Kant	often	illustrates	this	idea	with	examples	involving	physical	forces	(e.g. opposite	motions, opposing 71 McDowell	(1996); Ginsborg	(2006b), Ginsborg	(2008). It	is	not	actually	clear	that	only	the	conceptualist reading	can	accommodate this	aspect	of	Kant's	view. A non-conceptualist	may	well	agree that the categories	are	necessary	for	empirical	knowledge	while	nevertheless	denying	that	they	are	necessary	in accounting	for	the	intentionality	of	perceptual	experience. Cf. Hanna	(2001), 46-65, Hanna	(2005), 2567; Bird	(2006), 193-207; Watkins	(2008); Allais	(2009), 392-4; Watkins	(2012); Tolley	(2013); McLear (Forthcoming	a), §3; McLear	(Forthcoming	b), §5.2. 72 For discussion see Stevenson (2003); Chignell (2007a), Chignell (2007b); Watkins (2008), Watkins (2012). July	21, 2014-Forthcoming	in Philosophy	Compass 24 The	Kantian	(Non)-Conceptualism	Debate Colin	McLear attractive	and	repulsive	forces; cf. A264–5/B320–1). Moreover, Kant	considered	a	further	kind	of	repugnance, wherein	the	subject	itself	is	"cancelled	out". In	other	words, it would	be	impossible	for	any	being	to	exist	that	would	instantiate	such	repugnant	properties.73 In	order	for	knowledge	to	be	possible, the	demonstration	of	the	real	possibility of	the	object	of	knowledge	must	be	secured. If	this	is	correct	then	there	seems	to	be	at least	a prima	facie tension	between	attributing	to	Kant	both	the	claim	that	possession of	some	battery	of	concepts	is	necessary	for	intuition	to	have	epistemic	standing, and the	claim	that it is	via intuition	that	one's	concepts (or the	judgments	constituted	by them)	first	attain	epistemic	legitimacy. How	could	a	concept	confer	epistemic	standing to	intuition	prior	to	that	concept's	being	shown	to	be	legitimate? They	may	well	be	a Kantian	basis	for	answering	this	question, but	more	needs	to	be	said	by	the	conceptualist	to	defend	the	supposed	Kantian	provenance	of	this	second	version	of	the	"Myth	of the	Given"	argument.74 Finally, both	Sellars	and	McDowell	claim	that it is	simply	a	mistake	to think	that mental	states	which	are	purely	the	upshot	of	causal	interactions	with	the	world	could themselves	stand	as	reasons	for	empirical	belief. Sellars	remarks	that	such	a	mistake	is "of	a	piece	with	the	so-called	'naturalistic	fallacy'	in	ethics"	(Sellars	(1963), 146). Sellars himself	gives	no	clear	argument	for	this	claim.75 McDowell	focuses	on	the	distinction between	the	kinds	of	mental	states, the	occurrence	of	which	we	are	responsible	for, such as	judgment, and	those	which	simply happen to	us, in	the	way	that, e.g. a	fit	of	sneezing might	happen	to	one.76 Once	again, we	can	see	the	suggested	parallel	in	a	conceptualist	reading	of	Kant. If	conceptual	capacities, such	as	the	categories, are	necessary	for the	occurrence	of	perceptual	experience	then	experience	is	not	merely	something	that causally happens to	the	subject, but	rather	is	something	that	the	subject	herself	partially accounts	for, in	much	the	same	way	that	she	accounts	for	her	endorsement	of	the	content	of	propositional	judgment. It	is	not	clear	that	this	argument	is	construed	as	anything more	than	Kantian	in	spirit. Certainly	though, there	does	seem	to	be	a	deeply	Kantian point	behind	the	notion	that	reasoning	is thinking	for	oneself, and	that	this	requires	that the	structure	of	one's	thoughts	be, in	some	sense, determined	by	oneself.77 73 For	discussion	see Chignell	(2011), 144–5; Chignell	(2014); McLear	(Forthcoming	b), §§4.3	and	5.2. 74 A further possibility is that	Kant's views are genuinely divided	here, and that subsequent	moves in German	idealism	reflect	this	fact. See Pippin	(1989), ch. 2	and	the	sources	cited	in	note 57 above. 75 Watkins	(2008); Watkins	(2012). 76 McDowell	(1996), ch. 1-2; McDowell	(1998a), 433-4; McDowell	(2003), 80-5; cf. Engstrom	(2006), 8-13. 77 This	suggests	that	Kant's	views	of	practical	and	theoretical	reason	have	a	broader	unity. For	one	classic statement	of	such	an	interpretation	see O'Neill	(1989), ch. 1; cf. Stevenson	(2004); McDowell	(2009), chs. 4, 5, and	7. July	21, 2014-Forthcoming	in Philosophy	Compass 25 The	Kantian	(Non)-Conceptualism	Debate Colin	McLear [O]ne	cannot	possibly	think	of	a	reason	that	would	consciously	receive direction	from	any	other	quarter	with	respect	to	its	judgments; since	the subject	would	then	attribute	the	determination	of	his	judgment, not	to	his reason	but	to	an	impulse. Reason	must	regard	itself	as	the	author	of	its principles	independently	of	alien	influences. (G 4:448) Whether	or	not	Kant	himself	intended	his	arguments	concerning	the	role	of	concepts in	experience	to	be	taken	in	the	ways	that	Sellars, McDowell, and	others	have	suggested, it	is	clear	that	he	has	been	a	central	source	of	inspiration	for	these	positions. Needless to	say, the	dispute	as	to	Kant's	exact	position	regarding	these	matters	continues.78 Summary To say that	Kant is a	conceptualist is, as	we	have seen, to say that	he thinks (i) the content	of	an	intuition	(i.e. an	"experience"	in	our	contemporary	sense)	is	a	kind	of	representational	relation	to	an	object; (ii)	such	relation	to	an	object	depends	on	a	synthesis directed	in	accordance	with	concepts; (iii)	synthesis	in	accordance	with	concepts	sets correctness	conditions	for	the	intuition's	representation	of	a	mind-independent	object. The	conceptualist	reading	promises	to	make	sense	of	Kant's	argument	in	the	Transcendental	Deduction	by	showing	how	perceptual	experience	depends	on	a	synthesis	by the	categories. Assuming	that	we	have	such	experience, if the	categories	are	necessary	for	perceptual	experience, then	they	have	legitimate	application	to	the	objects	of experience. In	this	manner	conceptualism	purports	to	have	an	interpretive	advantage over	non-conceptualist	readings. Conceptualists	further	claim	that	their	reading	best explains	how	perceptual	experience	could	play	a justificatory role in the	fixation	of belief. However, we	have	also	seen	several	apparent	problems	for	the	conceptualist	reading. First, though	much	of	what the	conceptualist says	may	be true	of	Kant's	views concerning	"cognition"	[Erkenntnis]	(or	"experience"	[Erfahrung]	as	he	often	uses	the term)	it is	less	clear	that	it is	true	of	perceptual	experience	or	intuition. Second, the conceptualist	must	be	able	to	account	for	the	more	primitive	role	that	perception	seems to	play	in	Kant's	cognitive	theory, as	well	as	the	seeming	fact	that	he	acknowledges	that perceptual	experience	is	something	we	share	with	non-rational	animals. Third, conceptualist	readings	seem	to	threaten	the	coherence	of	the	arguments	of	the	Transcendental Aesthetic, and	thus	the	coherence	of	Kant's	broader	critical	position. Fourth, Kant's	own philosophy	of	mathematics	may	require	that	intuition	be	understood	as	a	form	of	nonconceptual	representation. Finally, it	is	not	at	all	clear	that, for	Kant, intuitions	have 78 Hanna	(2011a)	disputes	the	idea	that	Kant	is	centrally	concerned	with	denying	the	role	of	the	Given	in the	way	suggested	by	Sellars	and	McDowell. See	also	the	references	cited	in	note 71 above. July	21, 2014-Forthcoming	in Philosophy	Compass 26 The	Kantian	(Non)-Conceptualism	Debate Colin	McLear correctness	conditions. This	is	a	basic	assumption	of	the	conceptualist	position	and	is presupposed	by	its	other	commitments. Going	forward, conceptualism	needs	to	clarify	how	its	reading	is	compatible	with Kant's	arguments in the	Transcendental	Aesthetic, as	well	as	his	views	regarding	the cognitive	capacities	of	non-rational	animals. It	also	needs	to	do	more	to	motivate	confidence	in	the	genuinely	Kantian	provenance	of	the	family	of	arguments	that	go	under the	moniker	of	criticisms	of	the	"Myth	of	the	Given." Similarly, the	non-conceptualist reading	would	be	greatly	helped	by	a	more	extensive	account	of	the	compatibility	of non-conceptualism	with	the	argument	of	the	Transcendental	Deduction. Both	sides	of the	debate	need	also to	account for	objections to the	content	assumption. Much	of the	furor	over	Kant's	endorsement	or	denial	of	conceptualism	has	tracked	contemporary	issues	in	the	philosophy	of	perception. But	whatever	the	fortunes	of	conceptualism and	non-conceptualism	as	contemporary	philosophical	doctrines, our	understanding	of Kant's	philosophy, and	in	particular	his	theory	of	cognition, has	been	greatly	extended by	the	debate.79 References Abela, Paul	(2002). Kant's	Empirical	Realism. New	York: Oxford	University	Press	(p. 22). Adams, Robert Merrihew	(1994). Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist. Oxford: Oxford University	Press	(p. 9). Allais, Lucy	(2009). "Kant, Non-Conceptual	Content	and	the	Representation	of	Space". In: Journal	of	the	History	of	Philosophy 47.3, pp. 383–413. doi: 10.1353/hph.0. 0134 (pp. 8, 13, 18–20, 22, 24). Anderson, R. Lanier (2001). "Synthesis, Cognitive	Normativity, and the	Meaning of Kant's	Question, 'How	Are	Synthetic	Cognitions	a	Priori	Possible?'" In: European Journal	of	Philosophy 9.3, pp. 275–305	(p. 15). - (2004). "It	Adds	up	after	All: Kant's	Philosophy	of	Arithmetic	in	Light	of	the	Traditional	Logic". In: Philosophy	and	Phenomenological	Research 69.3, pp. 501–540 (p. 10). - (2005). "The	Wolffian	Paradigm	and	Its	Discontents: Kants	Containment	Definition of	Analyticity	in	Historical	Context". In: Archiv	für	Geschichte	der	Philosophie 87.7, pp. 22–74	(p. 10). Aquila, Richard E. (1983). Representational	Mind: A	Study	of	Kant's	Theory	of	Knowledge. en. Bloomington: Indiana	University	Press	(p. 18). - (2003). "Hans	Vaihinger	and	Some	Recent	Intentionalist	Readings	of	Kant". In: Journal	of	the	History	of	Philosophy 41.2, pp. 231–250	(p. 18). 79 Thanks	to	Derk	Pereboom, Clinton	Tolley, and	the	participants	in	my	graduate	seminar	on	conceptualism at	the	University	of	Nebraska–Lincoln	in	the	fall	of	2013	for	helpful	discussion	and	comments. July	21, 2014-Forthcoming	in Philosophy	Compass 27 The	Kantian	(Non)-Conceptualism	Debate Colin	McLear Aquila, Richard E. (2008). "Intentional	Objects	and	Kantian	Appearances". In: Philosophical	Topics 12.2, pp. 9–37	(p. 18). Bird, Graham	(2006). The	Revolutionary	Kant: A	Commentary	on	the	Critique	of	Pure Reason. Peru, IL: Open	Court	Publishing	Company	(pp. 19, 20, 24). BonJour, Laurence	(1985). The	Structure	of	Empirical	Knowledge. en. Cambridge, MA: Harvard	University	Press	(pp. 22, 23). Brewer, Bill	(1999). Perception	and	Reason. New	York: Oxford	University	Press	(p. 23). Brook, Andrew	(2013). "Kant	and	Time-Order	Idealism". en. In:A	Companion	to	the	Philosophy	of	Time. Ed. by	Adrian Bardon	and	Heather Dyke. Oxford:Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 120–134	(p. 3). Burge, Tyler (2003). "Perceptual	Entitlement". In: Philosophy	and	Phenomenological Research 67.3, pp. 503–548	(pp. 11, 13). Byrne, Alex	(2009). "Experience	and	Content". In: The	Philosophical	Quarterly 59.236, pp. 429–451. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.614.x (p. 5). Carson, Emily	(1997). "Kant	on	Intuition	and	Geometry". In: Canadian	Journal	of	Philosophy 27.4, pp. 489–512	(p. 10). - (1999). "Kant	on	the	Method	of	Mathematics". In: Journal	of	the	History	of	Philosophy 37.4, pp. 629–652. doi: 10.1353/hph.2008.0905 (p. 10). Chignell, Andrew (2007a). "Belief in Kant". In: The Philosophical Review 116.3, pp. 323–360. doi: 10.1215/00318108-2007-001 (p. 24). - (2007b). "Kant's	Concepts	of	Justification". In: Noûs 41.1, pp. 33–63	(pp. 23, 24). - (2011). "Real	Repugnance	and	Our	Ignorance	of	Things-in-Themselves: A	Lockean Problem	in	Kant	and	Hegel". de. In: Internationales	Jahrbuch	des	Deutschen	Idealismus	2009: Glaube	und	Vernunft. Ed. by	Fred Rush, Jürgen Stolzenberg, and	Paul W. Franks. Berlin: Walter	de	Gruyter, pp. 135–159	(p. 25). - (2014). "Kant	and	the	'Monstrous'	Ground	of	Possibility". In: Kantian	Review 19.1, pp. 53–69. doi: 10.1017/S1369415413000290 (p. 25). Davidson, Donald	(1986). "A	Coherence	Theory	of	Truth	and	Knowledge". In: Truth	and Interpretation: Perspectives	on	the	Philosophy	of	Donald	Davidson. Ed. by	Ernest LePore. Oxford: Basil	Blackwell, pp. 307–319	(p. 23). Engstrom, Stephen	(2006). "Understanding	and	Sensibility". In: Inquiry 49.1, pp. 2–25 (pp. 16, 25). Evans, Gareth	(1982). The	Varieties	of	Reference. Ed. by	John McDowell. Oxford: Oxford	University	Press	(p. 11). Falkenstein, Lorne	(1995). Kant's	Intuitionism: A	Commentary	on	the	Transcendental Aesthetic. en. Toronto: University	of	Toronto	Press	(p. 19). Friedman, Michael	(1992). Kant	and	the	Exact	Sciences. en. Cambridge: Harvard	University	Press	(p. 10). - (2012). "Kant	on	Geometry	and	Spatial	Intuition". en. In: Synthese 186.1, pp. 231– 255. doi: 10.1007/s11229-012-0066-2 (pp. 9, 10). July	21, 2014-Forthcoming	in Philosophy	Compass 28 The	Kantian	(Non)-Conceptualism	Debate Colin	McLear George, Rolf	(1981). "Kant's	Sensationism". In: Synthese 47.2, pp. 229–255. doi: 10. 1007/BF01064346 (p. 19). Ginsborg, Hannah	(2006a). "Empirical	Concepts	and	the	Content	of	Experience". In: European	Journal	of	Philosophy 14.3, pp. 349–372	(pp. 8, 15). - (2006b). "Kant and the	Problem	of Experience". In: Philosophical Topics 34.12, pp. 59–106. doi: 10.5840/philtopics2006341/24 (pp. 5, 8, 15, 24). - (2008). "Was	Kant	a	Nonconceptualist?" In: Philosophical	Studies 137.1, pp. 65– 77. doi: 10.1007/s11098-007-9163-3 (pp. 8, 18, 20, 24). Gomes, Anil (2010). "Is Kant's Transcendental Deduction of the Categories Fit for Purpose?" In: Kantian Review 15.02, pp. 118–137. doi: 10 . 1017 / S1369415400002466 (p. 21). - (2014). "Kant on Perception: Naıve Realism, Non-Conceptualism and the BDeduction". In: The	Philosophical	Quarterly 64.254, pp. 1–19. doi: 10.1093/pq/ pqt019 (pp. 2, 8, 18, 21). - (Manuscript). "In	Kantian	Phrase"	(p. 18). Griffith, Aaron M. (2012). "Perception	and the	Categories: A	Conceptualist	Reading of	Kant's Critique	of	Pure	Reason". en. In: European	Journal	of	Philosophy 20.2, pp. 193–222. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2010.00404.x (pp. 2, 9, 16, 20, 21). Grüne, Stefanie	(2008). "Begriffe	als	Regeln	der	Wahrnehmung". In: Recht	und	Frieden in der Philosophie Kants: Akten des X Internationalen Kant-Kongresses. Ed. by Valerio Rohden et al. Berlin: Walter de	Gruyter, pp. 267–278. doi: 10 . 1515 / 9783110210347.2.267 (pp. 17, 18). - (2009). Blinde	Anschauung. Frankfurt	am	Main: Vittorio	Klostermann	(pp. 4–6, 17, 18, 23). - (2011). "Is	There	a	Gap	in	Kants	B	Deduction?" In: International	Journal	of	Philosophical	Studies 19.3, pp. 465–490	(p. 21). Gunther, York H., ed. (2003). Essays	on	Nonconceptual	Content. en. Cambridge: MIT Press	(p. 1). Haag, Johannes	(2007). Erfahrung	und	Gegenstand. Frankfurt	am	Main: Vittorio	Klostermann	(p. 23). Hanna, Robert	(2001). Kant	and	the	Foundations	of	Analytic	Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford	University	Press	(p. 24). - (2002). "Mathematics	for	Humans: Kant's	Philosophy	of	Arithmetic	Revisited". In: European	Journal	of	Philosophy 10.3, pp. 328–352. doi: 10.1111/1468-0378. 00165 (p. 10). - (2005). "Kant	and	Nonconceptual	Content". In: European Journal	of	Philosophy 13.2, pp. 247–290. doi: 10.1111/j.0966-8373.2005.00229.x (pp. 8, 13, 14, 24). - (2006). Kant, Science, and	Human	Nature. Oxford: Clarendon	Press	(p. 14). July	21, 2014-Forthcoming	in Philosophy	Compass 29 The	Kantian	(Non)-Conceptualism	Debate Colin	McLear Hanna, Robert	(2008). "Kantian	Non-Conceptualism". In: Philosophical	Studies 137.1, pp. 41–64. doi: 10.1007/s11098-007-9166-0 (pp. 13, 14, 22). - (2011a). "Beyond	the	Myth	of	the	Myth: A	Kantian	Theory	of	Non-Conceptual	Content". In: International	Journal	of	Philosophical	Studies 19.3, pp. 323–398	(pp. 8, 14, 26). - (2011b). "Kant's	Non-Conceptualism, Rogue	Objects, and the	Gap in the	B	Deduction". In: International	Journal	of	Philosophical	Studies 19.3, pp. 399–415. doi: 10.1080/09672559.2011.595188 (pp. 13, 14, 21). Heck, Richard G. (2000). "Nonconceptual	Content	and	the	"Space	of	Reasons"". In: The	Philosophical	Review 109.4, pp. 483–523	(p. 13). Hegel, G. W. F. (1977). Hegel: Faith	and	Knowledge: An	English	translation	of	G. W. F. Hegel's	Glauben	und	Wissen. en. Ed. by	Walter Cerf	and	Henry Silton Harris. Albany: SUNY	Press	(p. 21). Heidegger, Martin	(1997). Kant	and	the	Problem	of	Metaphysics. en. Bloomington: Indiana	University	Press	(p. 23). Hinton, John Michael	(1973). Experiences: An	Inquiry	Into	Some	Ambiguities. en. Oxford: Oxford	University	Press	(p. 5). Howell, Robert	(1973). "Intuition, Synthesis, and	Individuation	in	the Critique	of	Pure Reason". In: Noûs 7.3. ArticleType: research-article	/	Full	publication	date: Sep., 1973	/	Copyright	©	1973	Wiley, pp. 207–232. doi: 10.2307/2214348 (p. 14). Janiak, Andrew	(2012). "Kant's	Views	on	Space	and	Time". In: The	Stanford	Encyclopedia	of	Philosophy. Ed. by	Edward N. Zalta. Winter	2012	(p. 9). Kalderon, Mark Eli	(2011). "Before	the	Law". en. In: Philosophical	Issues 21.1, pp. 219– 244. doi: 10.1111/j.1533-6077.2011.00202.x (p. 23). Keller, Pierre (1998). Kant and the	Demands	of Self-Consciousness. en. Cambridge: Cambridge	University	Press	(p. 21). La Rocca, Claudio	(2008a). "Der	dunkle	Verstand: Unbewusste	Vorstellungen	und	Selbstbewusstsein	bei	Kant". In: Recht	und	Frieden	in	der	Philosophie	Kants. Akten	des X. Internationalen	Kant-Kongresses 2, pp. 447–458	(p. 5). - (2008b). "Unbewusstes	und	Bewusstsein	bei	Kant". In: Kant-Lektionen: Zur	Philosophie	Kants	und	zu	Aspekten	ihrer	Wirkungsgeschichte. Ed. by	Manfred Kugelstadt. Würzburg: Königshausen Neumann, pp. 47–68	(p. 5). Land, Thomas (2011). "Kantian Conceptualism". In: Rethinking Epistemology 1, pp. 197–239	(pp. 15, 18, 21). Longuenesse, Béatrice (1998). Kant	and	the	Capacity to Judge. Princeton: Princeton University	Press	(pp. 9, 10, 15, 18, 21, 23). MacFarlane, John	(2002). "Frege, Kant, and	the	Logic	in	Logicism". In: Philosophical Review 111.1, pp. 25–65. doi: 10.1215/00318108-111-1-25. eprint: http: //philreview.dukejournals.org/cgi/reprint/111/1/25.pdf (p. 10). July	21, 2014-Forthcoming	in Philosophy	Compass 30 The	Kantian	(Non)-Conceptualism	Debate Colin	McLear Matherne, Samantha	(Unpublished). "Images	and	Kant's	Theory	of	Perception". Unpublished	manuscript	(pp. 2, 15). McDowell, John	(1996). Mind	and	World: With	a	New	Introduction. Cambridge, MA: Harvard	University	Press	(pp. 8, 11, 12, 19, 22–25). - (1998a). "Lecture	I: Sellars	on	Perceptual	Experience". In: The	Journal	of	Philosophy 95.9, pp. 431–450	(pp. 22, 23, 25). - (1998b). "Lecture	II: The	Logical	Form	of	an	Intuition". In: The	Journal	of	Philosophy 95.9, pp. 451–470	(p. 22). - (1998c). "Lecture III: Intentionality	as	a	Relation". In: The Journal	of	Philosophy 95.9, pp. 471–491	(p. 22). - (2003). "Hegel	and	the	Myth	of	the	Given". In: Das	Interesse	des	Denkens: Hegel aus	heutiger	Sicht. Ed. by	Wolfgang Welsch	and	Klaus Vieweg. München: Wilhelm Fink	Verlag, pp. 75–88	(pp. 21, 23, 25). - (2007). "Hegel's	Idealism	as	Radicalization	of	Kant". In: Internationales	Jahrbuch des	deutschen	Idealismus=International	Yearbook	of	German	Idealism 5. Reprinted in	McDowell	2009, 69–89, pp. 157–175	(p. 21). - (2008). "Avoiding	the	Myth	of	the	Given". In: John	McDowell: Experience, Norm and	Nature. Ed. by	Jakob Lindgaard. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 1–14	(p. 14). - (2009). Having	the	World	in	View: Essays	on	Kant, Hegel, and	Sellars. Cambridge: Harvard	University	Press	(p. 25). - (2013). "Perceptual	Experience: Both	Relational	and	Contentful". en. In: European Journal	of	Philosophy 21.1, pp. 144–157. doi: 10.1111/ejop.12005 (p. 14). McLear, Colin	(2011). "Kant	on	Animal	Consciousness". In: Philosophers'	Imprint 11.15, pp. 1–16	(pp. 5, 8, 19). - (Forthcoming	a). "Two	Kinds	of	Unity	in	the Critique	of	Pure	Reason". In: Journal of	the	History	of	Philosophy (pp. 8, 9, 17, 20–22, 24). - (Forthcoming	b). "Kant	on	Perceptual	Content". In: Mind (pp. 2, 8, 13, 15, 16, 23– 25). Messina, James	(2014). "Kant	on	the	Unity	of	Space	and	the	Synthetic	Unity	of	Apperception". In: Kant-Studien 105.1, pp. 5–40. doi: 10.1515/kant-2014-0002 (pp. 9, 21). Naragon, Steve	(1990). "Kant	on	Descartes	and	the	Brutes". In: Kant-Studien 81.1, pp. 1– 23	(pp. 8, 19). O'Neill, Onora	(1989). Constructions	of	Reason: Explorations	of	Kant's	Practical	Philosophy. en. Cambridge: Cambridge	University	Press	(p. 25). Onof, Christian	and	Dennis Schulting	(Forthcoming). "Space	as	Form	of	Intuition	and	as Formal	Intuition. On	the	Note	to	B160	in	Kant's Critique	of	Pure	Reason". In: The Philosophical	Review (pp. 9, 21). Parsons, Charles (1964). "Infinity	and	Kant's	Conception	of the	"Possibility	of	Experience"". In: The	Philosophical	Review 73.2. ArticleType: research-article	/	Full	pubJuly	21, 2014-Forthcoming	in Philosophy	Compass 31 The	Kantian	(Non)-Conceptualism	Debate Colin	McLear lication	date: Apr., 1964	/	Copyright	©	1964	Duke	University	Press, pp. 182–197. doi: 10.2307/2183335 (p. 10). Parsons, Charles	(1992). "The	Transcendental	Aesthetic". In: The	Cambridge	Companion	to	Kant. Ed. by	Paul Guyer. Cambridge: Cambridge	University	Press. Chap. 2, pp. 62–100	(p. 10). Peacocke, Christopher	(1992). A	Study	of	Concepts. Cambridge, MA: MIT	Press	(p. 11). Pereboom, Derk	(1988). "Kant	on	Intentionality". In: Synthese 77.3, pp. 321–352. doi: 10.1007/BF00869290 (pp. 18, 19). Pereira, Roberto Horácio de Sá	(2013). "What	is	nonconceptualism	in	Kant's	philosophy?" en. In: Philosophical	Studies 164.1, pp. 233–254. doi: 10.1007/s11098011-9851-x (p. 14). Pippin, Robert B. (1982). Kant's	Theory	of	Form: An	Essay	on	the	Critique	of	Pure	Reason. en. New	Haven: Yale	University	Press	(p. 23). - (1989). Hegel's	Idealism: The	Satisfactions	of	Self-Consciousness. en. Cambridge: Cambridge	University	Press	(pp. 21, 25). Pryor, James	(2005). "There	is	Immediate	Justification". In: Contemporary	Debates	in Epistemology. Ed. by	Matthias Steup	and	Ernest Sosa. Oxford: Blackwell. Chap. 7, pp. 181–202	(p. 23). Rohs, Peter (2001). "Bezieht	sich	nach	Kant	die	Anschauung	unmittelbar	auf	Gegenstände?" In: Akten	des	9. Internationalen	Kant-Kongresses. Vol. II. Berlin: Walter De	Gruyter, pp. 214–28	(p. 22). Schulting, Dennis	(2012). "Kant, Non-Conceptual	Content	and	the	'Second	Step'	of	the B-Deduction". In: Kant	Studies	Online, pp. 51–92	(pp. 15, 21). Sellars, Wilfrid	(1956). "Empiricism	and	the	Philosophy	of	Mind". In:Minnesota	studies in	the	philosophy	of	science 1, pp. 253–329	(p. 22). - (1963). Science, Perception, and	Reality. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview	Publishing Company	(pp. 22, 23, 25). - (1968). Science	and	Metaphysics: Variations on	Kantian	Themes. London: Routledge	&	Keegan	Paul	(pp. 15, 23). Shabel, Lisa	(2006). "Kant's	Philosophy	of	Mathematics". In: The	Cambridge	Companion to	Kant	and	Modern	Philosophy. Ed. by	Paul Guyer. Cambridge: Cambridge University	Press, pp. 94–128	(p. 10). Siegel, Susanna	(2010). "The	Contents	of	Perception". In: The	Stanford	Encyclopedia	of Philosophy. Ed. by	Edward N. Zalta. Fall	2013	(p. 1). Siegel, Susanna	and	Nicholas Silins	(Forthcoming). "The	Epistemology	of	Perception". In:Oxford	Handbook	of	Philosophy	of	Perception. Ed. by	Mohan Matthen. Oxford: Oxford	University	Press	(p. 23). Smit, Houston	(2000). "Kant	on	Marks	and	the	Immediacy	of	Intuition". In: The	Philosophical	Review 109.2, pp. 235–266	(p. 4). July	21, 2014-Forthcoming	in Philosophy	Compass 32 The	Kantian	(Non)-Conceptualism	Debate Colin	McLear Speaks, Jeff	(2005). "Is	There	a	Problem	about	Nonconceptual	Content?" In: The	Philosophical	Review 114.3, pp. 359–398	(p. 13). Stevenson, Leslie	(2003). "Opinion, Belief	or	Faith, and	Knowledge". In: Kantian	Review 7.1, pp. 72–101	(p. 24). - (2004). "Freedom	of	Judgement	in	Descartes, Hume, Spinoza	and	Kant". In: British journal	for	the	history	of	philosophy 12.2, pp. 223–246	(p. 25). Strawson, Peter Frederick	(1966). The	Bounds	of	Sense. London: Routledge	(p. 15). - (1970). "Imagination	and	Perception". In: Experience	and	Theory. Ed. by	Lawrence Foster	and	Joe William Swanson. Amherst: University	of	Massachusets	Press	(p. 15). Sturm, Thomas and Falk Wunderlich (2010). "Kant and the Scientific Study	of	Consciousness". In: History	of the	human	sciences 23.3, pp. 48–71. doi: 10.1177/ 0952695110363355 (p. 5). Sutherland, Daniel	(2008). "Arithmetic	from	Kant	to	Frege: Numbers, Pure	Units, and the	Limits	of	Conceptual	Representation". In: Kant	and	Philosophy	of	Science	Today. Ed. by	Michela Massimi. Vol. 63. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge	University	Press, pp. 135–164. doi: 10.1017/S1358246108000088 (p. 10). Thompson, Manley	(1972). "Singular	Terms	and	Intuitions	in	Kant's	Epistemology". In: The	Review	of	Metaphysics 26.2, pp. 314–343	(p. 16). Tolley, Clinton (2011). "Kant	on the	Content	of	Cognition". In: European Journal	of Philosophy, n/a–n/a. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2011.00483.x (pp. 13, 15). - (2013). "The	Non-Conceptuality	of	the	Content	of	Intuitions: A	New	Approach". In: Kantian	Review 18.01, pp. 107–136. doi: 10.1017/S1369415412000313 (pp. 8, 13, 15, 16, 20, 22, 24). Van Cleve, James	(1999). Problems	from	Kant. Oxford: Oxford	University	Press	(pp. 3, 5, 19). - (2012). "Defining	and	Defending	Nonconceptual	Contents	and	States". In: Philosophical	Perspectives 26.1, pp. 411–430	(p. 1). Watkins, Eric	(2008). "Kant	and	the	Myth	of	the	Given". In: Inquiry 51.5, pp. 512–531 (pp. 15, 22, 24, 25). - (2012). "Kant, Sellars, and	the	Myth	of	the	Given". en. In: The	Philosophical	Forum 43.3, pp. 311–326. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9191.2012.00427.x (pp. 22, 24, 25). Waxman, Wayne	(1991). Kant's	Model	of	the	Mind: A	New	Interpretation	of	Transcendental	Idealism. en. Oxford: Oxford	University	Press	(p. 21). Wenzel, Christian Helmut (2005). "Spielen	nach	Kant	die	Kategorien schon	bei	der Wahrnehmung	eine	Rolle? Peter	Rohs	und	John	McDowell". In: Kant-Studien 96.4, pp. 407–426	(p. 21). Willaschek, Marcus (1997). "Der	Transzendentale Idealismus und die Idealität von Raum	und	Zeit". In: Zeitschrift für	philosophische	Forschung 51.4, pp. 537–564 (pp. 16, 22). July	21, 2014-Forthcoming	in Philosophy	Compass 33 The	Kantian	(Non)-Conceptualism	Debate Colin	McLear Williams, J. J. (2012). "How	Conceptually	Guided	Are	Kantian	Intuitions?" In: History of	Philosophy	Quarterly 29.1, pp. 57–78	(p. 2). Wunderlich, Falk	(2005). Kant	und	die	Bewusstseinstheorien	des	18. Jahrhunderts. de. Berlin: Walter	de	Gruyter	(pp. 5, 6). July	21, 2014-Forthcoming	in Philosophy	Compass